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Abstract
This essay examines the effectiveness of international humanitarian aid. It fo-
cuses on the case study of Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF), analyzing how its
organizational structure and principles can act as a measure for the effective-
ness of its field operations. MSF’s HIV/AIDS clinics throughout Kenya as well
as their international campaigning efforts are presented as an effective way to
provide access, care, and treatment for HIV/AIDS. The overall conclusions of
the essay draw specifically from MSF, suggesting that their long-term aid com-
mitments should expand in both breathe and depth and that the organization
is a model of effectiveness for other large international humanitarian aid orga-
nizations to follow.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“Our action is to help people in situation of crisis.  And ours is not a contented action.” 
-James Orbinski, 1999 Noble Prize Acceptance Speech 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Some wonder why the medical relief organization Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF), 
also known as Doctors Without Borders, is often referred to as the “cowboys” of 
humanitarian aid.  This rough and tough group of doctors and their medical teams that “go 
where no one else will go” have quite the reputation for affecting change in some of the dire 
situations that the world has ever seen.  What makes this group so special?  What drives their 
successes?  As medical non-governmental organizations (NGOs) around the world wonder 
about and debate where their place is within the international community, MSF seems to act 
independently, essentially paying no head to any expressed limitations.  Their recent 
expansion into “long-term” medical aid is a perfect example.  They are suppose to be a 
medical relief organization, yet since the mid 1990s they have been setting up shop in 
numerous countries, starting clinics and working with the countries’ governments to get 
those in need access to treatment.  The HIV/AIDS crisis in Kenya and MSF’s actions through 
its Access to Essential Medicines Campaign and treatment clinics provides a detailed case 
study for the reader or researcher interested in understanding the complex puzzle of MSF and 
its unique and effective work in humanitarian aid.   
 Presently, more than 28 million people on the African continent are infected with 
HIV.1  With the current fragmented and selective response of the international community, 
UNAIDS proposes that Africa will remain within a whirlpool of “traps and legacies” and 80 
million people globally will have died from AIDS by 2025.2  Global AIDS conferences, 
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states, international and national organizations have promised “Access for all” in regards to 
treatment.  But with the amount of time, money and other resources pledged, this is a blatant 
impossibility.  What is clear, however, is that without treatment, most of these people will die 
over the next decade and the number of people infected will most likely double. “AIDS is not 
only a deadly disease; it is the greatest scientific, political, and moral challenge of our era.”3  
If organizations, such as MSF, wish to attempt to stop the tide of this epidemic, they must 
combat the crisis of HIV/AIDS as a long-term medical emergency. 
There are indeed thousands of NGOs working hard at improving the plight of those 
affected by HIV/AIDS, but most fail to raise awareness for this medical emergency.  In 
contrast, not only does MSF recognize the scientific and moral need but it is one of the few 
that speaks out about the political side of the crisis and advocates for change.  It was the first 
non-governmental organization to provide emergency medical assistance and publicly bear 
witness to the plight of the populations they served.  Its commitment to “temoignage” or 
bearing witness to the underlying causes of suffering makes it unique among NGOs that 
focus on emergency healthcare aid.  The former President of MSF France, Rony Brauman, 
stated, “We are by nature an organization that is unable to tolerate indifference.  We hope 
that by arousing awareness and a desire to understand, we will also stir up indignation and 
stimulate action.”4
Though the organization discourages the use of the playful nickname, the cowboys 
are indeed crossing into a new frontier and are doing quite well.  In essence, this essay will 
discuss MSF’s efforts to extend into long-term medical emergency relief for HIV/AIDS and 
seek to illustrate that they are the most effective in providing care and treatment to those in 
need.  This effectiveness is due to the influence of MSF’s unique history, principles, 
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organizational structure, and the implementation of its values.   
 
Methods 
There are two types of inquiry that will be performed - one is practical the other is 
organizational. The former is in large part a consequence of the latter.  Organizational theory 
will be discussed briefly as will an in depth analysis of the structure and organization of 
MSF.  The practical inquiry will examine MSF’s long-term medical field efforts in Kenya to 
provide HIV/AIDS care and treatment.  Its aim is to illustrate how one organization has 
brought theory and concept into reality to make an effective organization.  The overall goal is 
to start out with a broad scope of the theoretical analysis and gradually narrow it as the MSF 
comes into focus as a progressive international NGO within the sector of long-term 
humanitarian aid.  The thorough analysis of Medecins San Frontiers (MSF) as an 
international NGO dedicated to the crisis of HIV/AIDS in Africa, most specifically Kenya, 
will be based on a single case study, and at times use the comparative method with other 
NGOs in the same field, analyzing and explaining how and why they are effective in their 
mission towards treating those in need with high quality health care.  That which seems to 
cause this effectiveness will be closely and thoroughly analyzed to illustrate the hypothesis 
that MSF is the most effective international non-governmental organization providing long-
term medical relief, including prevention, care, and treatment, in the medical emergency of 
HIV/AIDS.  
There are certain causal claims that will be made in order to support the hypothesis 
for the effectiveness of MSF.  These claims will be an answer to the question: what is it 
about MSF that makes it appear to be the most effective as a large international organization 
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in treating HIV/AIDS in crisis ridden areas?  A thorough analysis of this single case study 
will be performed to reveal the important aspects of MSF’s mission and charter, their method 
of operations, their funding, their political stance, particularly dealing with neutrality, which 
lead to their effectiveness. 
In order to illuminate these key features of the causal narrative, a system of 
measurement for the effectiveness of NGOs, such as MSF, in their efforts towards treating 
and preventing HIV/AIDS must be developed.  This system will weigh certain variables 
more than others as well as take into consideration any antecedent conditions that may be 
present.  These conditions could include that of a direct conflict, the national government, 
culture and society, the particular group that is in the most need, and anything else that makes 
a particular case truly unique.  My measurement for effectiveness will be comprised of 
qualitative evaluations of MSF’s impact on the Kenyan HIV/AIDS epidemic, its political and 
social contexts, and the international impact MSF has had as a result of temoignage.  The 
impact of MSF’s political presence will focus on greater access to affordable medicines, in 
particular anti-retroviral drugs (ARV’s), official or unofficial changes in policy or legislation, 
and their political activism to combat the epidemic.  The impact of MSF’s social presence 
will focus on the quality of care given to the patients, MSF’s ability to reach those in most 
need, and any change in the social stigma that the disease carries.  A summary of these 
efforts and their effectiveness based on these qualitative evaluations and recommendations 
for change will be made. 
The goal of the in-depth process-traced case study of MSF and the use of the 
comparative method to include other international NGOs is to show the importance of key 
variables, such as MSF’s sources for its funding.  I am basing the use of this method off of 
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Evera’s comment that, “hence a thorough process-trace of a single case can provide a strong 
test of theory” (Evera, 65).  The comparisons will allow MSF to be evaluated against their 
own peers, yeilding fruitful recommendations for both sides.  The same goes for presenting 
the different MSF programs.  This analytical inductive approach to theory development that 
will analyze how the approach that MSF takes in its stated mission and adherence to its 
principles through operations is better than other NGOs. 
Finally, the study will be carried out in three phases.  The first phase will explain 
organizational theory and develop a working knowledge of MSF, investigating their history, 
organizational structure and principles.  The second phase will carry out the case study of 
MSF in Kenya, its clinics and its efforts of temoinage.  The third phase will look at the 
results of the case study to assess MSF’s effectiveness and make both theoretical and 
operational suggestions.   
 
Sources 
The research for this project has been concentrated within four categories: 
organizational theory, humanitarian aid, the organization of MSF, and MSF in Kenya..  The 
research also followed a progression that began in general terms and moved towards the 
more particular.  It started with NGOs within the international community have been 
combating HIV/AIDS and gradually moved to how emergency medical relief NGOs within 
the arena of humanitarian aid have become involved.  The research then began to specifically 
focus on MSF and its medical efforts, most specifically in Kenya.  The organizational 
structure, its relationships, and the principles that the organization lives by were considered 
crucially important aspects to the research findings.  In particular, MSF’s Access to Essential 
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Medicines Campaign was carefully analyzed and researched in order to assess its impact on 
the Kenyan society.  Thus, the case study of MSF in Kenya and its efforts towards 
HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment was born.  In addition, research on other large 
international organizations with a medical component was performed for the sake of 
comparison, making the case study of MSF in Kenya more applicable. 
In general, the resources necessary for this project include: books, journals, book 
reviews, Kenyan newspapers, and internet websites.  An informal interview was conducted 
from a fellow colleague who had volunteered under MSF France in Homa Bay for a period of 
a few weeks in spring 2004.  The resources needed for such a project have been found at the 
libraries of Boston College, online, through phone conversations or interlibrary loan.  Two 
websites in particular, www.doctorswithoutborders.org and www.msf.org, have been fully 
utilized.  They have been particularly useful in obtaining detailed information about the 
HIV/AIDS clinics and programs in Kenya which MSF runs.  The particular journal, Journal 
of the American Medical Association, which MSF uses to publish many of its findings has 
been be used.  Online access to The East African and the Daily Nation, two Kenyan 
newspapers, has been the main source of information directly from Kenya.  The book, Hope 
in Hell: Inside the World of Doctors Without Borders, by Dan Bortolotti has been used 
extensively for information regarding the structure, organization, and history of MSF.  David 
Rieff’s book, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis, has been particularly useful as 
a source for the comparison of MSF to other medical humanitarian organizations, most 
specifically International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as well as information on the 
international debates taking place over the definitions of neutrality, impartiality, and 
independence.  Fiona Terry’s book, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian 
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Action, was influential for the overall conclusions of the case study.   
   
External Validity 
The validity of this project will be four-fold.  First, it will provide MSF with new 
resources to evaluate their programs throughout Kenya, enabling them to make judgments on 
the current status of projects and perhaps offer suggestions aimed towards change and 
improvement towards greater effectiveness.  Secondly, it will give other international 
humanitarian NGOs a single case study to compare and contrast themselves, possibly leading 
towards institutional or organizational change.  Thirdly, it will inform the general reader 
about the organization of MSF and how such an activist organization is fighting the 
overwhelming crisis of HIV/AIDS in a particular context of a developing African country.  
Finally, it will help illustrate to the reader how they as individuals may actively participate on 
a small scale in order to help alleviate the suffering of so many in combating an 
overwhelming worldwide crisis. 
The principles and organizational structure of MSF, and consequently its operations, 
are the most effective approaches for reaching those in greatest need.  This conclusion will be 
of importance for the practical and effective implementation of theory and moral obligation.  
HIV/AIDS is an archetypal case that the international community, specifically international 
humanitarian NGOs, should utilize as a great opportunity to implement their professed 
priorities and values.  What role these organizations claim within the international 
community, will be determined by how they react to the AIDS crisis.  The purpose of the 
MSF case study is for the organization to serve as a progressive role model that takes 
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advantage of their unique role within the international community, advocating for 
institutional changes and implementing their own practical goals worldwide. 
Secondly, there is a general claim that HIV/AIDS has become an economic and social 
security issue.  Where the disease is rampant, it affects that society to the core.  The working 
class in those societies is the first to die off, leaving the young and the elderly no one to help 
them meet their needs.  With the majority of a population left unable to support themselves, a 
society is vulnerable to collapse which greatly destabilizes the state and increases the 
possibility for conflict.  The economy is also negatively affected as fewer workers, especially 
less skilled workers, equal less production and therefore less income.  The decrease in a 
developing country’s economy translates into a decrease in economic potential for the 
affluent nations in this interconnected world.  How MSF has gone about its medical relief 
will shed light on how to deal with the security issues that arise from the pervasive character 
of the virus. 
The dedication of MSF to helping those in need works towards putting into practice 
the moral imperative that natural law suggests.  Considering the effects that MSF has on the 
moral framework of humanitarian action is important because its principle of bearing witness 
gives it influence over other similar organizations and the general public. General Romeo 
Dellaire, head of the United Nation’s peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda during the genocide in 
the 1990’s, said in a television interview regarding the genocide, “Are we all human?  Or are 
some more human than others?”  A hope for this project is to build up and maintain within 
these concerned humanitarian organizations and individuals awareness and support of what 
has been coined the “humanitarian imperative.” 
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 Why We Should Care   
 “The global common good, including participation in the good of health care, is an 
indispensable moral criterion for evaluating policies and politics, as well as for our personal 
investments of votes, dollars and time.” 
-Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Realigning Catholic Priorities” 
 
Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire often questions, “Are all humans human?  Or are 
some less human than others?”  When one considers that there are currently 40 million 
people living with the virus around the world, almost 30 million of those in Africa alone, and 
with grossly insufficient action being taken by world governments to combat the crisis, it is 
hard to say that those infected with HIV/AIDS are allowed maintain the same human dignity 
as others.  The sick are merely a statistic and in fact, are less than human.  Unfortunately, 
many people do not even realize that their answer to Dellaire’s question is “yes.”  MSF, on 
the other hand. has been committed to answering “no.”  MSF’s principle of helping those in 
greatest need has led them to care for those infected with HIV/AIDS in Kenya as well as 
other places. They are there to heal and bear witness to the sick and their plight; to reach out 
to those in a poor resource setting in need of healing. 
For those who are passionate about people, any kind of people, just because they are 
people, this analysis is extremely important.  Social justice demands that the individual give 
all s/he can for the common good in his attempt to help restore human dignity to all.  The 
global common good should be thought of as a link among local and global realities where 
certain goods are shared and beneficial for all members of the global community.  In July 
2001, the recently deceased Pope John Paul II spoke of the consequences that the global 
common good should have on nation states to President George W. Bush.  "Respect for 
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human dignity and belief in the equal dignity of all the members of the human family 
demand policies aimed at enabling all peoples to have access to the means required to 
improve their lives...."5
MSF contributes to the common good by helping to restore human dignity in 
supplying medical care to the poor and bearing witness, stressing the importance of a more 
just distribution of healthcare.  For other organizations or individuals, their contribution to 
social justice and the common good may mean something else.  MSF has merely set a 
precedent for encouraging those who wish to uphold the humanitarian imperative by 
contributing to the common good in order to respect the human dignity and equality of all, so 
that all humans are human.  Even though the ordinary United State’s citizen may feel too 
distant from those dieing of HIV/AIDS to help, “the humanity of such persons calls us to 
recognize their dignity” and therefore, we must act to restore it.6
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Chapter 2: Case Study and Organizational Theory 
 
 
Case Study 
 
My central concern about international NGO effectiveness in long-term medical relief 
in HIV/AIDS will gradually narrow its scope from the more theoretical to the single case 
study of MSF.  The examination of MSF and its efforts towards HIV/AIDS care and 
treatment in the East African country of Kenya, what it does, why it does it, and how it does 
it, combines the practical with the theoretical.  The reader will begin to see the relevance of 
theory as well as its importance as she examines the way it is implemented in MSF, an 
effective organization at combating the HIV/AIDS crisis for those most in need. The 
narrative of MSF will seek to identify certain aspects or principles of the organization that set 
the NGO apart from others, proposing it is because of these aspects that MSF is more 
effective.  The case study of MSF will begin with a background of the organization’s history 
and organizational structure and then will be Kenya specific, focusing on the areas of Homa 
Bay, Busia and Nairobi.  The history and present day efforts of MSF in HIV/AIDS 
prevention and treatment in each of these areas, how these efforts reflect the organization’s 
principles, priorities, and stated goals, and finally how effective MSF seems in each region 
will be examined.  Within the analysis, different programs and organizations will be 
compared and contrasted with each other illustrating the different options and choices there 
are for international NGOs to organize and implement their goals.   
 The strength to a case study approach is the ability to test how the independent causes 
the dependent variable, illustrating how a theory or hypothesis actually works (Evera, 55).  In 
this case it is to analyze how numerous independent variables cause the dependent variable, 
namely effectiveness.  Its use as an analytical tool of actual reality, however, will ultimately 
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be limited to what Njolstad calls the “indeterminacy of historical interpretation” (Njolstad, 
223).  There are plenty of social scientists who consider the methods of case study and 
comparison to be strong methods of analysis.  However, some such as Njolstad, do point out 
limitations and weaknesses, but none regard case studies as pointless or useless.  It is 
precisely because of their strengths of in depth analysis and ability to explain how that I 
desire to use the case study in my thesis.  Thus, I will attempt to adhere closely to a 
standardized method of analysis in order to produce a structured and focused comparison.  
 
Validity 
 
In terms of King, Keohane, and Verba, “validity refers to measuring what we think 
we are measuring” (p.25).  My in-depth analysis of MSF as an organization as well as a 
relatively narrow component of MSF - its long-term medical HIV/AIDS programs in Kenya - 
will provide the reader with a rich array of data and evidence with which to measure the key 
concepts that are presented within this single case study.  Any statistical analyses that were to 
be made about the impact of MSF in Kenya would be virtually impossible.  There would be 
no isolated data that just included MSF as an organization.  All the numbers would also 
include the impact of the Kenyan government and other NGOs that are present, such as 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS).  
Therefore, qualitative analysis of a case study is the most fruitful method of study in which to 
realize the extensive impact that MSF has had. 
 
Limitations 
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Limitations in validity will occur in the motivations behind the interview that I conducted, 
my own bias in approaching the analysis of MSF, and my choice of it as a case study in the 
first place.  Lack of extensive personal experience with either the organization itself or the 
specific Kenyan programs will also put limits on the depth of analysis possible, however, at 
the same time decreasing some of the possibility for biases.  Also, the exact replication of 
programs or institutional organizations is not recommended as conditions always vary 
between organizations and countries.  Implementation into other organizations must be 
tailored to best fit that particular organization’s needs within the context in which they are 
working.  However, organizational values, such as the humanitarian imperative, temoinage, 
and sources of funding can be more generally applied.   
 By using a simple research design of a single case study, my research and its 
conclusions will be easily repeatable by any interested parties.  The in-depth analysis will 
also make it easy for readers to continue in any comparison study that they wish to develop 
between MSF and other like NGOs.     
 
 
Organizational Theory – Restructuring World Politics 
 
 The past 25 years have seen a wave of increase in the number of non-governmental 
organizations and transnational advocacy groups.  Not only are the groups growing in 
number, but also in breadth, depth, and impact.  In fact, they are a part of a larger movement 
of transnational advocacy groups working together to establish new, as well as strengthen 
old, international norms to restructure world politics.7  The goal of these groups is to “create, 
strengthen, implement, and monitor” international norms.8  Creation of these new norms 
helps to support and continues to create an “international community” in which state and 
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non-state actors see themselves bound by a set of common rules and norms.  How these 
groups go about accomplishing these goals, when they are successful, and the complications 
and challenges they run into on the way will be alluded to through this study, specifically 
their desire to establish international norms of justice in healthcare and treatment.   
For the purpose of this paper, nongovernmental organizations are defined as private, 
voluntary, nonprofit groups whose primary aim is to publicly influence some form of social 
change.9  This third sector within the international community, with the first two sectors 
being comprised of states and business, is unique.  While states always search for authority 
and businesses search for profit, transnational advocacy groups such as MSF, search for 
meaning.  Their motivation for action derives from the principles and beliefs that are thought 
to uphold this meaning.  They could be considered “moral entrepreneurs.”  Most NGO’s and 
other transnational actors, such as transnational advocacy networks, coalitions, and 
movements, when considered on an individual basis among states, are relatively weak.  Their 
power within international politics comes with their ability to persuade and apply pressure 
based on the dissemination of information, images, and moral arguments.  
These groups wield this power in order to help create and institutionalize new 
international norms.  A norm within international relations literature is defined as a “shared 
expectation held by a community of actors about appropriate behavior for actors with a given 
identity.”10  It is through pursuing this goal that this third sector of the international 
community has become a significant and important actor.  For instance, there is a subset of 
international norms that both states and businesses are bound to and claim to uphold which 
are not necessarily in line with their own self-interest.  These norms do not directly promote 
stability between states through economic or political collaboration nor do they promote the 
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bottom line of profit making.  States and businesses have, therefore, adopted a set of norms 
that limit their authority and ability to maximize profit in all circumstances, in large part 
because of the influence of the third sector.     
Success in establishing these norms lies partially in the availability of what is often 
known as “political space,” similar to what Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink call “political 
opportunity structures (POS).”11  A “closed” POS is generally an authoritarian or semi-
authoritarian regime which is compared to an “open” POS consisting of most democratic 
regimes.  Although Khagram’s article speaks first on the importance of governmental POS’s, 
for the sake of this paper and the third sector, it is more important to concentrate on the 
POS’s that international institutions, such as MSF, also create for transnational advocacy.  
Relatively closed to relatively open political structures can have an important impact on the 
types of issues taken up by transnational advocacy groups and the priority by which they 
pursue them.   
 The increased stature of international norms is important for helping to create 
international political space for humanitarian issues such as international public health or 
human rights.  Key initiators of new norms are international organizations and transnational 
nongovernmental actors, who are not only creating temporary political space for their issues 
but are also establishing themselves as a permanent political feature within the international 
community.   
The ability that these groups have to establish a permanent power and presence within the 
international community stems from their possession of what Keohane and Nye have called 
“soft” or informal power.12  This type of power stems from the ability to communicate and 
persuade with the dissemination of information.  Through information and discussion, groups 
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can question, criticize, publicize, and propose ideas or norms.  In doing so, they present new 
voices and ideas, enhance deliberation and representation within international institutions, 
and promote accountability and transparency.  It is through these actions that the third sector 
gains moral authority, the power to influence the international agenda, and shape the way in 
which issues are perceived and understood.  Although the power of the NGO is more 
“hidden,” many NGOs are successfully attempting to incorporate their power more formally 
into international debates.  For example, there are many NGO’s that are now welcome to 
attend UN global conferences, giving them unprecedented opportunities for organizing, 
media attention, and lobbying.13  The soft and informal power of NGO’s makes them an 
unquestionably important and contributing actor to the international community.     
It is because these non-state actors are crucial to the dialogue about and decision for the 
creation of new norms through their exercise of soft power that Sikkink, Riker, and Khagram 
speak of them as “restructuring world politics.”  Within the international community, the 
absence of a world government is “attenuated by a parallel structure of common rules and 
norms.”14  This divided power structure between states and norms creates two potential 
sources for regime change: power shifts (such as the decline of a hegemon) or norm change.  
For NGO’s, access to the second power structure based on international norms allows them 
to “mobilize and achieve influence beyond their command of traditional power resources 
because world power is as much about authority and legitimacy as it is about material 
resources.”15  Thus, the extent to which transnational advocacy groups alter the norm 
structure of the international community is the extent to which they restructure world politics. 
 
Organization of NGO’s and Its Challenges 
 17
 If NGO’s are restructuring world politics, it is both useful and important to examine 
the way in which they choose to organize themselves so that one can understand why and 
how they accomplish their goals and thus, the potential effects their actions have on the 
international community on both a universal and a particular level.  In general, NGO’s have 
four significant internal organizational features that fundamentally shape and affect what the 
organization is and what it does.  The four organizational features are:  origination, internal 
distribution of power and influence, sources of funding, and willingness for collaboration.  
Each of these organizational features is basic to the priorities and activities of an NGO and its 
effectiveness.   
 First, where an NGO originated is important to examine because there is often uneven 
influence and representation driven by the political or structural logic of North-South 
differences.  Although the geographic variety has increased, the vast majority of NGOs 
originates and remains based in the developed world, with Europe and North America being 
the top two locations.  This pattern can have a number of detrimental effects.  The most 
powerful and influential NGOs that possess the most extensive networks and resources are 
most likely located in the North because they are more likely to be connected to rich and 
powerful developed states that have strong influences in international organizations.  This 
uneven distribution of influence also causes uneven representation.  For instance, Northern 
NGO’s are more likely to promote what is typically known as “liberty rights” or individual 
political and civil rights, whereas Southern-based NGO’s focus more on “bread rights” or 
communal social, economic, and cultural rights.16  Although many NGOs proclaim to 
advocate for both sets of rights, many do not realize their commonalities between each other 
because of their different focuses and consequently sacrifice potential collaboration.  The 
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origination of NGOs therefore affects their networks, resources, representation, and 
collaboration.     
The second important organizational feature, the internal distribution of power and 
influence, represents the NGO’s commitment to being democratic within its own structure.  
The internal hierarchy of the institution, such as who participates in decision making about 
leadership and policies (staff, boards, volunteers, members, donors, those on whose behalf 
they organize) helps to show who is represented, to whom and if they are held accountable, 
and the degree of transparency.  Sometimes, even while institutions promote democracy, they 
are not themselves internally democratic.17  Is it better, for instance, for the field staff or the 
management to decide on operational policies?  To whom will they hold themselves most 
accountable – donors? Staff?  Those to whom they organize?  Who will they tell of their 
activities?  Will decision-making be concentrated or decentralized?  Will their staff be 
primarily local or mostly made up of ex-patriots? An NGO’s internal democratic system of 
organization is daunting yet fundamental to its task. 
The source of funding for an NGO is the third organizational feature.  Many NGO’s 
are not membership based and therefore cannot rely on membership dues and donations for 
sustenance.  Instead, many rely on grants from foundations or governments and donations 
from other private organizations.  For example, almost half of all international human rights 
funding provided by United States foundations between 1973-1993 was provided by only one 
foundation – the Ford foundation.  Governments are also extremely important sources of 
funding for NGOs and have a way of influencing the NGO towards its own agenda.  Issues 
that often arise because of the source of funding or the competition for funding and are as 
such: that a few key individuals or governments can greatly affect NGO priorities; funding 
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for an NGO may come from the very government or organization that they monitor, 
influencing their independence; and useful collaboration and innovative new programs may 
be sidelined or even blocked.18  Also, foundations and governments tend to be biased toward 
larger and more established NGOs, effectively marginalizing the smaller ones and creating a 
false hierarchy of importance.  The problem has begun to be wrestled with, however, with the 
establishment of institutions such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria where money is first collected from multiple governments and then distributed based 
on need.   
Finally, an NGO must decide on the extent to which it is willing to cooperate with 
other NGOs, governments, or institutions that are doing similar or complementary work.  For 
instance, while an NGO’s standards and protocol for field operation may be regulated and set 
in order to ensure the best care of its patients, the management may be committed to being 
flexible and talking with other organizations in the area to brainstorm ideas for collaboration.  
Another factor that influences collaboration is competition for limited resources.  Funding, 
educated staff, and information are precious commodities and competition for them tends to 
diminish cooperation.    
It is through these three primary organizational features that an NGO takes shape.  
However, it must also acquire legitimacy in world politics.  An important aspect of this 
legitimacy is the attainment of “moral authority” to use as a power resource, thus giving the 
organization influence beyond its material capacity.19  This type of authority is crucial to 
effectiveness, particularly in relation to humanitarian crises.  In order to obtain legitimacy 
and make this claim on authority so that they may raise questions about the morality and 
legitimacy of states, institutions or international norms, NGOs must be perceived as having 
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some of the following attributes: impartiality and independence, veracity and reliability, 
representation, accountability and transparency.  A heated international debate is currently 
taking place about the definition and practical implementation of some of these attributes, 
particularly independence and impartiality and will be expanded on later with direct relation 
to MSF.  For now, the discussion will focus on why these attributes are essential for an 
effective NGO.  As already stated, the perception that others have towards an organization is 
extremely important.  It is through being perceived, both in theory and practice, as having 
these attributes that organizations receive their legitimacy.     
The first two attributes, impartiality and independence, have one goal in mind – an 
organization that possesses them can be perceived as not being self-interested.  The NGO’s 
legitimacy and moral authority stems from the perception that it is disinterested in acquiring 
economic or political power.  In essence, the organization exists to help others in need, not 
themselves.  Yet, there is a difficult balance to maintain because in order to continue its 
work, the NGO must obtain significant amounts of funding from different wealthy and 
powerful groups or persons or governments whose own priorities may influence those of the 
NGO.  However, as globalization continues and the world grows more interconnected, 
maintaining independence, particularly in funding, is fundamental for the humanitarian 
organization.  Amnesty International set an example once by self-limiting its resources by 
refusing to accept any money from governments or corporations.  In contrast, Helsinki 
Watch, the main United States NGO formed to monitor the Helsinki agreements, was created 
by a senior United States diplomat who was simultaneously the head of the Ford Foundation, 
the largest donor to Helsinki agreements.20  Thus, although access to public funding is 
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essential for many NGOs, it is a difficult balance to keep without it serving to undermine 
both the actual and perceived independence and impartiality of the organization.   
Veracity and reliability of information provided by the NGOs are the second 
important attributes in developing and maintaining legitimacy and moral authority.  An 
NGO’s power to persuade and spur into action relies heavily on the power of information and 
images.  For example, the Save the Children advertisements on television that promote 
sponsoring a child are full of pictures and stories of children.  Without the power of 
information to support their claims, an NGO’s authority is unsupported.  Also, any 
suggestion that an NGO’s information is inaccurate suggests that the legitimacy and moral 
authority of that organization is minimal at best. 
The next attribute, representation, relates back to the internal democracy of an 
organization.  Part of an NGO’s authority comes from its ability to claim to represent those 
who lack representation: the sick, the poor, the repressed, the weak.  Human rights 
organizations, for example, claim to represent the voices of individuals and groups in other 
countries that cannot speak for themselves.21  The characteristic of internal democracy is 
therefore necessary in order to ensure that this representation remains accurate and valid, 
especially when the headquarters of an NGO are located outside the culture or far away from 
the group of people the organization claims to represent.   
The last two attributes, accountability and transparency, are also closely related to an 
organization’s internal democracy.  In a sense, the extent of an NGO’s internal democracy as 
well as its moral authority reaches only as far as they are perceived as being accountable.  
Transparency, of information sources, activities, funding, and composition, is a prerequisite 
for accountability.  Unfortunately, many NGOs do not have effective mechanisms in place 
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for either attribute, thus significantly reducing their moral influence and power.  Even more 
regrettable, some are hesitant to establish any mechanism for measuring transparency or 
accountability, mistaking what would help to increase their moral authority and legitimacy 
for a limitation on their ability to act.  If NGOs wish to be seen as social change instigators, 
they must begin to take a more proactive role in solving the lack of actual and perceived 
accountability.22  A possible mechanism to develop could be modeled after the existing 
mechanisms of accountability for an interest group model or a professional model.  With the 
interest group model, representation of members, dues, and voting procedures for leadership, 
would be the main source of accountability.  The decision-making process would become 
transparent and the representation more democratic.  In the professional model, 
accountability would result from a greater amount of bureaucracy.  An organization could set 
up mechanisms to set standards of credentialing, and monitoring of standards and staff to 
ensure accountability.23  Other models or combinations of models can and should be 
developed in order that each organization is able to create and implement a mechanism of 
accountability to help ensure its internal democracy as well as its legitimacy and moral 
authority.   
NGOs and their networks are antidotes to domestic and intergovernmental networks.  
They are the third sector of the international community and occupy an important and 
formative role in world politics.  In order to be effective, there are crucial organizational 
features and attributes that must be developed and maintained.  As NGOs occupy a unique 
place in the international community, so also must their features and attributes be distinctive.  
There are many ways in which NGOs choose to ascribe to each of these characteristics. But 
when measured against the ideal standard of democracy, representation, and accountability, 
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most of these organizations fall short.  However, their capability and capacity to pursue 
morally significant issues through the assertion of soft power is restructuring world politics 
by affecting the structure of norms under which the international community operates.  
Improving upon their organizational short-comings is therefore in their own self-interest as 
well as the interest of the international community.     
 As a practical application of organizational theory, the history, development, and 
principles that MSF holds to will be discussed in detail so that the reader may understand 
their importance in the daily activities of MSF and their influence on the effectiveness of 
these activities. 
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Chapter 3: History and Organizational Structure 
 
“(MSF is) the most important humanitarian NGO in the world.  Its medical protocols 
have become the model for other relief organizations, and it is both envied and resented by 
other groups.  It is, in an important sense, the conscience of the humanitarian world.” 
 
- David Reiff, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis
 
 
And it all started with a couple of young dissatisfied French doctors. 
 
 
Formation 
 
In 1967, Biafra declared itself independent and seceded from Nigeria which caused a 
break out of civil war.  At the time, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
was largely in control of the humanitarian aid within the country and was able to deploy the 
most resources to the victims of the crisis.  They were, however, obliged to recruit doctors, 
many of them French and just out of medical school, to help with their projects.  One of these 
doctors was Bernard Kouchner, who would later be described in The Economist as, 
“Impulsive, provocative, frenetically energetic, teeming with ideas, articulate, generous, and 
courageous, Dr. Kouchner is also blunt, abrasive, impatient, disorganized, opinionated, and 
quick-tempered.” -  and would later co-found MSF.24  Even though he was not officially part 
of the ICRC, Kouchner was expected to adhere to the principles of the organization.  As part 
of his employment, Kouchner had to sign a statement in which he promised that he would not 
speak of or communicate about his mission in Nigeria, even after its termination, without 
prior authorization from the ICRC.  Little more than twenty years after Auschwitz, where this 
self-censorship had formed the basis of the silent approach ICRC had taken towards the 
concentration camps, Kouchner, as a Jewish doctor, felt that history was repeating itself.  He 
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believed that the Nigerian government was systematically killing the Ibo people while the 
ICRC stood silent.25   
At some point, Kouchner decided to break publicly with the organization, later stating 
that, “By keeping silent, we doctors were accomplices in the systematic massacre of a 
population.”26  When Kouchner returned to France, he organized marches and media events 
in Paris to raise awareness about the events in Biafra.  He and his colleagues also began to 
envision the formation of a humanitarian organization that would combine medical aid with a 
willingness to speak out about injustices experienced or seen by the volunteers in the field.  
At the same time, a group of medical journalists published a call for volunteer doctors to help 
the victims of earthquakes and floods.  The culture of Paris was active and assertive as 
France’s colonies claimed independence.  Posters were hung on the streets that featured a 
figure in riot gear with the words Frontiers (borders) = Repression below it.27  Thus, on 
December 20th, 1971, Kouchner and his colleagues and the group of medical journalists came 
together to make Kouchner’s vision a reality.  The independent relief organization, Medecins 
Sans Frontiers, was destined to refuse to conform and be an obedient member of the 
“humanitarian community,” and would instead learn to chart its own course of action.  
Although some jokingly MSF “the bastard child of a doctor and a journalist,” it was this 
bastard child that became the largest medical humanitarian organization in the world, sending 
more than 3,000 volunteers to over 80 countries every year to projects in conflict zones, 
refugee camps, and rural health clinics.28   
MSF’s first name was “Group d’Intervention Medico-Chirurgical d’Urgence, The 
name was meant to prioritize the rights of victims, thus opposing the type of silent relief that 
the ICRC had offered in Biafra.29  Although MSF was formed as a relief agency and remains 
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one to this day, it continues to take on more long-term care, such as providing anti-retroviral 
treatment for people with AIDS or treating tuberculosis and malaria.  While it is dedicated to 
alleviating the burden that HIV/AIDS brings to so many societies, MSF is clear on the 
limitations of its aid.  The project sites do not attempt to eradicate the root causes of poverty 
even though MSF knows that the lack of resources is a root cause of the spread of AIDS.  
Although MSF’s desire to remain in relief agency status limits its field activities from those 
of development agencies, it continues to advocate for those activities that will help 
complement their efforts.   
Where there is a distinct difference between development and relief agencies, there is 
also one between humanitarian organizations and human rights organizations.  MSF is of the 
former group.  While human rights organizations’ primary goal is to lobby for the protection 
of international humanitarian law, humanitarian organizations will remain neutral in order to 
gain access to victims.  From the beginning, MSF has struggled with its neutrality, valuing 
the principle of “temoinage” or bearing witness and not wanting to be an agent of complicity 
within a regime of oppression and torture.30  On the other hand, neutrality is the fundamental 
principle that aid organizations must hold to in order to prove that they have no political 
agenda and to gain access to victims.  MSF recognized this limiting factor at its inception, 
and although there was considerable division, placed the principle of neutrality in the fourth 
article of their charter.31  Kouchner, the leading opponent of the neutrality article, signed the 
charter as a compromise, knowing that the dispute would not end there.  In 1974, when a 
Kurdish envoy asked Kouchner if MSF would help support their rebellion in northern Iraq, 
he accepted.  Raymond Borel, co-founder of MSF with Kouchner and leader of the medical 
journalists, seethed at Kouchner’s decision.  Borrel had led the fight to uphold the neutrality 
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principle in the charter, and Kouchner’s decision to help the Kurds was blatantly taking sides 
in a political dispute.  The disagreement grew more intense as Kouchner acted on his 
decision to help by sending a team to Iraq.  The following year, 1975, at MSF’s annual 
assembly meeting, Kouchner and a colleague were elected into the top two positions within 
the organization.  The debate over which principles MSF should adhere to continued to 
simmer as Kouchner led MSF through its first successes in the following three years. 
First of all, in the mid 1970s, the amount of refugees in the world doubled, measuring 
up to 6 million people.32  The exploding refugee situation caused Claude Malhuret, a 
prominent doctor in MSF who worked with Cambodians fleeing the Khmer Rouge regime, to 
develop a new vision for MSF that included longer-term missions, better organization in 
logistics and administration, and more funds.  The young Malhuret quickly gained internal 
support, and Kouchner’s leadership became less popular.  In 1979, just eight years after their 
formation, MSF’s leadership was divided over its plan of action concerning the Vietnamese 
boat people crisis.  Kouchner wanted to send a “sea-borne ambulance” to save the stranded 
boat people and in the process attract media attention which would help to stimulate action 
from Western states.  However, Claude Malhuret and Rony Brauman, another young doctor, 
disagreed.  For them, the boat people were “symbolic” of the greater crisis occurring in 
Cambodia and not something to be used as a media stunt.  They should concentrate their 
resources on the mainland instead of using the majority of them to save a few.33  In the end, 
it came to a vote and 90 out of 120 were in favor of Malhuret and Brauman.  The outcome 
had enough serious implications for the NGO that Kouchner abandoned ship to start his own 
NGO called Medecins du Monde (MDM, doctors of the world).  With its new leadership, 
MSF would become more professional; their budget would triple its size in a year; and 
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ironically, it would once again push the limits of neutrality.34  As with the leadership of 
MSF, its principles remain fluid, evolving through internal debate, according to what is 
happening around them.      
As it grew, MSF developed country focused offices.  Each country – France, 
Belgium, Holland, Switzerland – ran their own offices, had considerable autonomy, and 
consequently, acquired different ways of doing things.  The country-based offices were 
efficient at logistics and admired for their frugal use of resources.  MSF developed the ability 
to have people anywhere in the world quicker than anyone else by plane, Land Cruiser, or 
foot.  As its offices grew, so did its voice.  While MSF Belgium stayed quiet, MSF France 
was not afraid to criticize Pol Pot’s regime in 1980, or Colonel Mengistu’s in Ethiopia (for 
which it was expelled from the country).  It is through these decisive actions and an internal 
culture of debate that these “medical mavericks” acquired a paradoxical image.  On one 
hand, their movement was very informal, decentralized, and full of young opinionated 
doctors.  On the other, their technical expertise was sophisticated and efficient, and their 
actions were decisive.35   
This new image helped to increase the popularity of MSF in the 1980’s, with 32 
percent of the French public that was polled naming MSF as their dream job.36  The 1990’s 
saw the globalization of MSF, with offices spreading beyond Europe to the United States, 
Canada, Japan, Hong Kong, and Australia.  However, the innocence and simplicity that many 
associated with humanitarian aid was subverted during the crises of Rwanda, Somalia, 
Bosnia, and Kosovo, causing disenchantment with those that supplied aid.  MSF was forced 
to face the complex reality of each crisis and the limitations it placed on their ability to help.   
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Fortunately, the disdain experienced by so many aid organizations during the 90s 
motivated some to work harder in order to fix what was broken.  James Orbinski was a hard-
working graduate from medical school in 1990 with a specialty in pediatric HIV and a 
previously earned international relations master’s degree.  Three years after he graduated, he 
was in Somalia with MSF and later volunteered in Rwanda during the genocide.  Also a 
philosopher, Orbinski was a perfect fit to be the new international president, helping to 
inspire new images in humanitarian aid, which, as it turned out, helped the organization win 
its first Nobel Peace Prize in 1999.  Orbinski used his presidency as an opportunity to present 
to the public a different type of humanitarian crisis, “More than ninety percent of all death 
and suffering from infectious diseases occurs in the developing world,” and tropical illnesses 
are killing people because, “life-saving essential medicines are either too expensive, or not 
available because they are not seen as financially viable, or because there is virtually no new 
research and development,” into new treatments.  “This market failure,” Orbinski stated, “is 
our next challenge.”37  With this speech, Orbinski advocated for the creation of a new 
humanitarian space for infectious diseases and HIV/AIDS.  MSF now had a new avenue in 
which to channel their relief efforts and embarked on their campaign of “change, not 
charity.”38   
 Today, less than ten years after the beginning of Orbinski’s campaign, about half of 
all the relief agency’s projects are focused towards long-term medical assistance that seeks to 
collaborate with the Ministers of Health in the national government, rehabilitate the hospitals, 
and organize vaccination programs.39  Programs and clinics are located in countries with 
collapsed or insufficient health care systems, with the aim of establishing a stable and self-
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sufficient healthcare structure.  In addition to field work, MSF also puts enormous time and 
energy into its worldwide Access to Essential Medicines Campaign.   
 The origin and development of MSF has been fueled by controversy.  From its 
beginnings in Paris, through its multiple changes in leadership, and finally to its commitment 
to long-term medical care in the face of enduring humanitarian health crises, it has proven 
itself flexible, changeable, intelligent, and successful in the face of adversity and crisis.   
 
Structural Organization 
 The history of MSF has heavily influenced the current structure of the organization.  
For instance, constant disagreements and diverse opinions have allowed for the autonomous 
development of each country’s own office, giving an overall decentralized atmosphere.  The 
institution, funding, program and staff policies, and priority of individual care are no 
accident.  Each has been carefully crafted by the organization in order to increase 
effectiveness.      
Institution 
Although MSF started in France, its world headquarters is in Geneva, Switzerland.  
Its coordinating body is located there and is named the International Council which includes 
the heads of each section or office, and an international president.  The Council serves as an 
overarching authority, but its power is limited and it does not decree to each operational 
section any orders.  MSF as a whole is a relatively nonhierarchical organization, purposefully 
providing to everyone a sense of ownership and commitment.  The decentralized structure 
creates for MSFers a “movement of like-minded members.” Instead of a formal, top-down 
organization.40  Each country office, such as MSF France or MSF Holland, has quite a bit of 
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autonomy, giving it  a unique style and personality which helps to add to MSF’s unique the 
culture of debate.  For instance, the French are passionate, arrogant, and disorganized while 
the Dutch are technical and organizational geniuses, and the Belgians have the most 
experience with HIV/AIDS work.41  With offices as different as these, opportunities for 
disagreement as well as great visions abound.     
As an institution, MSF’s operational offices in the field must be administered by the 
original five – France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and Spain.  The newer offices or the 
“partner” offices, the United States, Canada, Japan, Hong Kong, and Australia, are 
responsible for fundraising, recruiting volunteers, and raising public awareness and must 
always work in conjunction with an operational office.42  This structure can often appear to 
be quite inefficient.  For instance, it is possible to have multiple operational sections in one 
crisis area, each with its different heads of mission and supplies and each with its own focus 
and responsibilities.  Executive director of MSF Holland, Austen Davis helped shed light on 
the reasons for the operational structure when he said:  
One of the chief challenges to humanitarian aid is getting access to victims.  It’s a very entrepreneurial 
business, and putting all your eggs in one basket and having a monolithic structure isn’t as conducive 
as floating around a crisis with lots of little groups, lots of little teams, lots of contacts, trying different 
things.43
 
For many, MSF is a model of something that shouldn’t work, but does.  Even though it has 
no clear central authority, it is renowned for its ability to act quickly.  In fact, MSF’s capacity 
to succeed seems to resemble an urban legend that says that aerodynamically, the bumble bee 
shouldn’t be able to fly, but it doesn’t know it, so it goes on flying anyway.     
Another important aspect of MSF’s structural organization is its private and voluntary 
nature.  One of the reasons that Kouchner lost the internal power struggle in the 70s was 
because he insisted that humanitarianism should be in the service of states and at the heart of 
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state policy.44  For Kouchner, states needed to learn to be humanitarian.  They needed to be 
willing to fight for justice if a revolution of moral concern over human rights was to affect 
the international community.  His main opposition on this point was found in the other co-
founder of MSF, Raymond Borrel who saw relinquishing independence as the end of the 
humanitarian movement.45  Kouchner quit and MSF remained both private and voluntary, an 
organization that represents civil society.  This civil society organizational status has allowed 
MSF to capitalize on the new ‘global role’ of civil society by creating informal legitimacy for 
action and support through public opinion.46  It is also a great base from which to draw 
support.   
Funding 
Compared to the significant impact that MSF has had around the world, both in the 
number of lives saved as well as publicity about crises, their budget is not huge.  It’s about 
$400 million and over 80 percent of it comes from private donations.  Other agencies often 
spend more, such as the $1 billion that World Vision’s US branch spent in 2002.  Some 
humanitarian aid NGOs, give the impression that they rely much more on donations from the 
public than they really do.  It is often the case that these NGOs are heavily dependent on 
funding from government agencies.  In contrast, only about 20 percent of MSF’s total budget 
comes from international agencies, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and 
other governments.  These are the agencies that often become the “pork barrel” of other aid 
organizations, sometimes donating a large majority of their aid.47  Dependence on 
governments and the UN donors usually leads to increased institutionalism, bureaucracy, and 
unwillingness to speak up against those who provide the money.48  In support of its 
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independence from any outside influence, MSF relies on shrewd fundraising, frugality, low-
paid staff and unpaid volunteers, and monthly checks from private citizens.49  Often, MSF’s 
policy of “go first, worry about money later,” incites frustration and jealousy in the 
organizations that lack a public base and have to wait for government funding.  MSF has also 
made a strategic choice to stay small and independent, whereas others, such as CARE 
International that also possesses a private base, have used government funding to grow 
larger.50  MSF’s financial independence is MSF’s “trump card.”  Since they can literally be 
seen as advocating for the people through their financial donations, they have no need to 
support needless or even harmful strategies that other governments or UN programs have 
developed in order to maintain financial stability.51  
 A recent article by the President of Catholic Relief Services (CRS) discusses the way 
in which CRS faces its funding challenges.  The president is responding from a Catholic 
point of view to the argument that an agency is only as independent as its major public 
donors allow it to be.52  The president’s first assertion is that it is the organization’s 
responsibility to preserve their identity based on Catholic social teaching and defend their 
faith.  Next, he says they must look at the positive side of accepting public funding - a chance 
to make the government aware of their stance on important issues.  Although their roots and 
values lie in their Catholic origins, but they are not ignorant about the important role the US 
government could play in helping the poorest of the poor.  He acknowledges that any major 
donor will always exert influence, but it is still up to the agency to respond.  Third, CRS is 
not obliged to take the money, and does not take money for something they disagree with, for 
example the second Iraq War.  The Pope did not acknowledge it as a just war and so neither 
did CRS.  CRS showed their allegiance to the Pope by refusing to participate in any relief 
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“pre-planning.”53  After defending CRS against the government influence, the article also 
points to the fact that many corporations are getting intricately involved in development and 
that they may give more money than any bilateral or multilateral aid.54  In the end, the article 
speaks to the maintenance of a balance.  “Just as there is no contradiction in being both 
actively American and actively Catholic, there is no contradiction for us, as an American, 
Catholic agency to work within our civic system.”55  Therefore, they:  
stand forth as unapologetically Catholic and American.  Our commitment to our faith tells us that what 
we are doing is right; our commitment to our country affords us the opportunity to act according to 
these beliefs and to effect change from within where change is needed.56   
 
Although MSF would appreciate the words of the CRS president, it would state some 
precautionary measures and perhaps some disagreements.  First, even though there may be 
no literal contradiction between being Catholic and American, there are times in which 
tension is created by the dual identity does and a person is forced to choose between one over 
the other.  Also, MSF would disagree with the priority allegiance that CRS gives to America 
as a state.  Instead, MSF finds its allegiance in the people that make up the country they are 
in as well as the victims of a particular crisis.  Overall, the CRS article presents a respectable 
defense for accepting significant amounts of United State’s government money but it is far 
from the perceived and actual independence that MSF has gained as a result of its private 
donors.   
Staff 
Along with money, the quality and type of people that work for an organization are 
also crucial to its success.  And once again, MSF is surprising in their policies for their 
employees and volunteers.  Even though their name “Doctors Without Borders” may suggest 
an image of a team of doctors running around the world trying to save people, about three-
quarters of its staff and volunteers are not even doctors.57  Other unexpected aspects of the 
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MSF staff life are: that most are not even staff at all, but volunteers who are crucial in 
maintaining the dynamic culture of MSF; and the majority of the staff in field projects are 
national or local staff.   
Volunteerism is one of MSF’s core values and the mainstay of the organization.  
Without it, the organization could not operate.  MSF deliberately chooses inexperienced 
volunteers to be its main actors.  Although the policy seems somewhat backward, placing an 
inexperienced and low/unpaid volunteer in a leadership position, it actually works quite well 
in protecting MSF’s first priority of helping those in the most need.  Aid workers often get 
used to working in high stress and horrible conditions, which many times immunize them to 
doing anything radical about it.  With new, fresh and ambitious volunteers, MSF keeps ideas 
flowing in with vigorous energy and keeps a close emotional connection to those who are 
suffering.  In a sense, MSF is trying to institutionalize the initial reaction against suffering 
and injustice and the desire and drive to change it as well as developing a check against 
experiential cynicism.  In essence, they are looking for this reaction: “I don’t give a damn 
that you have seen twenty places that are worse than this.  This offends me, and I want to do 
something about it.”58
 Having a majority of their staff being national is also a priority for MSF.  Not only 
does this provide community involvement and education, but the expatriate operational staffs 
learn from the national staff how to treat the patients that they are trying to help because they 
know the diseases and parasites, etc.59  MSF is also deliberate in mixing both expatriates and 
national staff to promote relationship between societies, seeking solidarity.  Other NGOs, in 
comparison, often only hire expatriates for managers, leaving the field work to the local 
staff.60     
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Both the expatriate staff and the local staff are low paid and the volunteers are unpaid.  
Local staff, however, is paid slightly more than the going rate of other NGO’s in the area.    
While all travel and health insurance is paid for, a first-time field volunteer may receive a 
stipend of less than $1,000 a month, and an eight-year veteran manager, only three times the 
amount.  Even the executive director’s salary in the New York office has a ratio of three to 
one to the lowest paid employee.61  Although there is little pay involved in working with 
MSF, the organization will make sure that while an employee or volunteer is away from his 
home, he is not accruing any debt.  Even though there is no extravagant life to be lived off of 
MSF salaries, the low pay attracts unique people, especially those uncomfortable with the 
wealth of the West, just the type it is looking for.   
 In the field, most expatriates are neither doctors nor nurses (non-medical staff is about 
40 percent), but serve rather in supportive roles so that the doctors and nurses can treat as 
many patients as possible. 62  Each section has a head of mission who oversees all the 
projects within a particular country.  There are project coordinators that organize a specific 
team’s daily activities, financial coordinators, water and sanitation engineers, and logisticians 
(PCs, fincos, watsans, and logs respectively).  There are also humanitarian affairs officers 
and human rights lawyers who are there to help advise the field staff through their 
expertise.63   
 Altogether, the policies that MSF has put into place for its staff and volunteers help to 
keep the organization vigilant to the problems at hand, pure in their motivation for working, 
and focused on the needs of the individual people they are there to heal.         
Individual Care 
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It is the individual, one who is sick and in need, that is MSF’s first priority.  Each of 
the doctors and each of the volunteers that work for the organization are charged to assist 
those who need medical help now.  Every individual deserves care, and there is a 
responsibility placed on those who can provide that care to someone who cannot access it in 
order to restore that individual’s personal dignity.  There is urgency in this care because if a 
mass deprivation of healthcare is allowed to continue, human rights are systematically denied 
and the situation threatens to become “normal” to those not involved and the sense of 
responsibility diminishes.  It is the conviction of duty that MSF has to care for those in need 
that drives it to uphold the responsibility to human rights.  It is this priority of individual care 
that all of MSF’s principles are meant to uphold.  For instance, one must have neutrality, 
independence, and impartiality in order to gain maximum access to the patient that needs 
care in crisis ridden areas.   
MSF’s loyalties lie most strongly with the sick.  Distance must therefore be 
maintained from political and military actors so that the line between state action and 
humanitarian action is not blurred, says Nicolas Torrente, executive director of MSF USA, 
when speaking of impartiality and humanitarian aid in the Iraq war.64  Making peace is not in 
the business of MSF, nor is deciding who is right in the war.  MSF’s business is helping 
people in need which is only part of a jigsaw puzzle to peace.  In James Orbinski’s Nobel 
Prize speech, he said this: “Humanitarianism is not a tool to end war or to create peace.  It is 
a citizens’ response to political failure…and cannot erase the long-term necessity of political 
responsibility.”65  Though the limitations may be frustrating, this realistic view is a great 
strength.  MSF refuses to be idealistic to the dangers of giving aid and is, instead, realistic 
about the limiting factors and influence of its own aid and the responsibility of other groups.  
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 MSF’s priority for individual care to those in greatest need is essentially defined in 
negative terms: its mission is to stop the harm that is already being done to an individual.  All 
of MSF’s efforts are therefore meant to answer the question: what is a human being? as “one 
who is not made to suffer.”66  By structuring and organizing this hope into its organization, 
MSF has been effective in alleviating suffering.    
Although MSF has strong organizational strengths, it is far from perfect.  One of the 
largest complaints and criticisms heard about the NGO is its general reluctance to collaborate 
in its field work projects.  It is slow to coordinate and they are unwilling to work under 
another’s project.  They want to “be in the loop, but not in the noose.”67  There is value in 
MSF’s ability to criticize and evaluate “but they should do more to coordinate with 
partners.”68  For example, although MSF is providing the best AIDS care and treatment in 
Busia, Kenya it is in the process of building an entire hospital literally next door to the 
community hospital.  The MSF team there claims that they are not a development 
organization and that the effort they would have to put forth to cooperate with the existing 
hospital would hinder their provision of HIV/AIDS care.  Although MSF’s collaboration 
with the community hospital would probably affect the number of patients treated, it would 
have the positive attribute of working closely with the community and developing its 
healthcare skills.   
 Even though its actions can and should be questioned, MSF’s ability to adapt and to 
lead by example stems from its deliberate structural organization, giving the organization 
remarkable leadership in humanitarianism.  No structure or policy is put into place by 
accident or without plenty of debate involved.  It is constantly looking for new and better 
ways to reach more people in need.  In fact, David Reiff writes in his book, A Bed for the 
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Night, “the group’s next great accomplishment may be to rescue and redefine the ideal of 
humanitarianism itself.”   
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Chapter 4: Humanitarianism in Principle and in Practice  
 
“We must make up our minds.  Neutrality favors the oppressor, never the victim.  Silence 
encourages the persecutor, never the persecuted.” 
 
- Eli Wiesel 
 
In the quote above, Eli Wiesel, a Jew and an echoing voice of the Holocaust, states 
his opinion about the neutrality and silence of supposed aid organizations in times of crisis.  
Although there has been a recognized need for humanitarian aid organizations to purport and 
practice the fundamental principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence, Wiesel 
points to the damage that can occur if an organization is blinded by strict adherence to 
principles without recourse to the reality of a crisis situation.  To avoid this misuse, these 
three principles should be utilized as ‘operational tools,’ helping to obtain consent of 
belligerents and the trust of communities, and not as tools for conflict resolution.  They are 
not in themselves virtuous, but are a means to an end – and that end is to save the lives of 
people in urgent need.  Unlike charity, humanitarianism does not exist in a vacuum and the 
principles are a needed asset in order to maintain the Sans Frontiers (without borders) 
mentality that operates in a dirty reality, struggling to place humanitarian principles into 
practice.      
As a progressive humanitarian organization, MSF has been witness to the complex 
and energy-ridden international debates on neutrality, impartiality, and independence.  The 
affability and effectiveness of each are being questioned, particularly in regards to 
“politicized humanitarianism,” yet for MSF, these principles, their interpretation, and their 
usage are critical to the NGO’s survival as a humanitarian organization.  Though their 
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practical implementation must be carefully constructed, these principles are essential to 
maintain the humanitarian organization’s “single-minded purpose of alleviating suffering, 
unconditionally and without any ulterior motive.”69   
It is critical that MSF maintains its first focus on their responsibility to provide direct 
assistance to people in immediate need.  It is the humanitarian imperative that implies this 
need for universal and ‘borderless’ humanitarian responsibility and action.  If there is 
someone, anyone, in need anywhere in the world, the humanitarian is obligated to respond.  
He must be ready to challenge governments and the international community, since it is 
mainly the inaction of both that allows crises to persist.  For MSF the humanitarian act is: “to 
seek to relieve suffering, to seek to restore autonomy, to witness to the truth of injustice, and 
to insist on political responsibility.”70  It is an apolitical and civilian based act – the act of 
one human responding the need of another.71  It is concern for the humanitarian imperative 
as well as guaranteeing equal access to its humanitarian assistance that motivates MSF to 
maintain the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence.   
 
Misconceptions 
Unfortunately, these principles and their usage are often misconceived, which can 
lead to unintentional yet horrifying results. Case in point is the experience of Eli Wiesel in 
the Holocaust.  Humanitarian aid organizations, such as the ICRC, remained silent in the face 
of mass murder and human rights violations, in the name of neutrality and impartiality, so 
that they could maintain access to victims of concentration camps.  While desiring to help, 
their silence over the presence of the camps was in fact harmful to the situation.  “Silence has 
long been confused with neutrality, and has been presented as a necessary condition for 
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humanitarian action.”72  It is the misinterpretation of the use of neutrality that was the cause 
of Wiesel’s disgust of the principle.  Yet such terrible instances cause many to question:  
Does neutrality mean an organization has no backbone?  That they take no moral stance?  Is 
it even possible to remain neutral in a world dominated by power struggles?  What makes the 
debates on these questions complex and difficult is that while every humanitarian 
organization purports to be neutral, each has a slightly different way of implementing the 
principle the consequence of which has led to many harmful results.  In reaction, large 
groups within the international community have come to see the defense of neutrality as: 
naïve, meaning when an organization do not say anything, the absence of their opinion still 
has a political impact; a smokescreen, meaning its presence is for the protection against 
something else, such as deterrence; passivity, meaning they do not care to take a stance, such 
as whether or not a war is just; and guilt, meaning they are reluctant to distinguish 
themselves between the “guilty” and the “innocent.”  The pervasiveness of these 
misconceptions, spoken here specifically of neutrality, is threatening to the humanitarian act 
which is motivated by the humanitarian imperative.     
  
Neutrality 
The word “neutrality” comes from the Latin ne-uter, meaning “neither one thing nor 
the other.”  As is evident from the above misconceptions, neutrality is not in it of itself a 
virtue.73  In fact, neutrality is probably the most debated of the three principles within the 
humanitarian aid circles today.  Most organizations see its assertion as absolutely essential in 
obtaining access to those in need.  MSF is more careful in its adoption of the principle, 
however, by further clarifying what it means to them: “The principle of neutrality is not a 
 43
synonym to silence.”74  MSF will not support either side of a conflict, asserting its own 
political stance and evaluations of the conflict, but will speak out against atrocities that are 
occurring, regardless of which side the actions originate from.  It will not stand by as the 
vulnerable suffer without a voice.  This policy concerning neutrality did not, however, 
develop overnight.   
As recounted in the historical chapter, it was during MSF’s formation that the co-
founder Bernard Kouchner was adamant the new organization have the right to speak out 
against injustice when they saw fit and possessed substantiated evidence.  If it were not, he 
feared that MSF would end up like the ICRC and its incident in the Holocaust.  For 
Kouchner, this meant doing away with the principle of neutrality since it had been misused to 
the extent that he believed there was no way to rescue it.   Raymond Borel, one of the other 
key players, was a strong supporter for neutrality and believed that it could coexist with 
advocacy.  In the end, MSF’s charter was clear and concise about its principle of neutrality.75
 1974 saw the organization’s first real test on the implementation of its proclaimed 
neutrality.  The Kurdish envoy that was leading a rebellion in Iraq asked for and received 
support from a Kouchner led MSF.  The action had blatantly taken a side and could not be 
considered neutral.  For the next twenty years, MSF would struggle with the seeming 
paradox of protecting the crucial humanitarian principle of neutrality yet also maintaining its 
priority of aiding those in urgent need.  It was in 2001 that this debate came to a climax for 
MSF as an organization.  It had become so intense that the organization was deciding 
whether or not to completely remove its commitment to neutrality from its charter.  One side 
argued that aid had always been political and could not be kept from that fate and finally 
admitting this fact would better serve the organization and the people it desired to serve.  
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Others argued that without neutrality MSF’s humanitarian aid was necessarily politicized and 
assessments on which people to help could no longer be based on need alone.  In the end, the 
article remained in the charter with the understanding that neutrality is only a means to the 
end of helping those in need, and if that end cannot be accomplished, something else must be 
done.  
 
The Position of ICRC 
Since, in MSF’s opinion, the origin of its organization is directly related to the 
ICRC’s failure to utilize its neutrality to the greatest good in Biafra, it is helpful to compare 
and contrast the definition as well as the practical implementation of neutrality between the 
two organizations.   
The International Committee of the Red Cross is also an impartial, neutral, and 
independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and 
dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance.  It is the 
oldest of the humanitarian organizations as well as the richest and most organized.76  The 
ICRC is in a unique position to deal with the international debates on principles because it is 
hybrid in nature; it is both a non-governmental organization as well as an intergovernmental 
organization (IGO).  While NGO’s are always private organizations, intergovernmental 
organizations are established by governments through a treaty and have their own special 
organs to fulfill particular functions.77  Thus, IGOs have a mandate from governments for 
their existence and activities and enjoy certain working facilities known as privileges and 
immunities.  ICRC is not a full-fledged IGO because its organization as a whole is not 
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mandated by governments; rather it is its functions and activities that are through 
international humanitarian law, specifically the Geneva Conventions.   
The organization works within its international mandate to prevent suffering by 
promoting and strengthening humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles.  The 
three principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence are, for the ICRC, necessities in 
order to work for protection, assistance, preventive action, and cooperation with national 
societies.  For example, in order to help civilians and detainees, restore families, and find 
missing persons, the ICRC must be free to move about, to talk to many people on any side 
and search through the country.   
One way the ICRC utilizes their neutrality is by making no distinction between good 
wars and bad wars; between just and unjust causes; or even between aggressors and 
innocents.78  For the ICRC, neutrality means dealing with authorities on any side of a 
conflict that so that they can help the vulnerable.  In order to continue to enjoy the confidence 
of all, the ICRC believes that the movement may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any 
time in controversies of political, racial, religious or ideological nature. It also states that:  
Neutrality is not an end in itself, but rather a means towards an end, which is to be able to act on behalf 
of people protected by humanitarian law and to make a positive difference to those who are affected by 
armed violence.  Neutrality means making no judgment about the merits of one person’s needs as 
against another’s; it does not mean condoning violations of International Humanitarian Law.79   
 
At first glance, this definition of neutrality may seem identical to that which MSF acts 
upon.  However there are two crucial differences.  First, when dealing with victims of a 
humanitarian crisis, MSF does measure one person’s needs against another’s.  Their stated 
purpose is to help those in greatest need.  The practical differences that this implies between 
the two organizations are evident in a case study of the Rwandan refugee camps in the mid 
90s after the genocide had occurred.  The refugees in the camps were being provided their 
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basic food and health needs, but not their acute need for protection.  Both organizations, 
ICRC and MSF, had been present before, during, and immediately after the genocide 
working in the refugee camps.  However, by the end of 1994, MSF had decided to 
completely withdraw from providing any humanitarian assistance due to their desire to 
protect those in greatest need.  The refugee camps consisted of two types of people: those 
that had been victims of the genocide and its perpetrators.  After the genocide had ended, 
militia members and former members of the Rwandan army had re-armed themselves from 
within the camps, causing the refugees to become hostages and relief workers found 
themselves aiding and abetting the genocidaires.80  By the presence of the refugee camps and 
through the provision of international humanitarian aid, the killers were granted impunity, 
given access to healthcare, and fed.  The camps were undeniably a breeding ground for 
violence and MSF decided to withdraw its aid completely, the consequences of which 
stimulated other organizations to follow suite and the United States to revise its policy with 
regard to its support for the camps.81  This decisive and influential act of speaking out was 
not done by the ICRC because they do not distinguish between aggressors and innocents and 
it would have meant that they could not longer help anyone in need.  For MSF, it is exactly 
this type of situation that led to the ICRC knowing about the concentration camps before 
World War II and yet remained silent.   
This leads to the other crucial difference between the two organizations’ practical 
interpretations of neutrality.  For MSF, the negotiation with leaders of a conflict is limited to 
getting by roadblocks and other avenues of access.  MSF is only concerned with helping 
those in need.  The ICRC, on the other hand, is also dedicated to being a neutral intermediary 
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between opposing sides in a conflict.82  Therefore, for them, engaging in conversation 
between both sides remains a priority.    
Today, there appears to be many different “levels” of intensity to neutrality and which 
level a humanitarian organization decides to sign on to is up to its discretion.  Some 
organizations, such as the ICRC, are strictly neutral; some promote neutrality but in fact in 
many instances act against their claims; and some are by nature politicized, such as many 
arms of the United Nations.  Up to this point, however, all of them agree that there is to be no 
aid workers whom carry weapons.  MSF even discourages former military personnel to 
volunteer in their organization.  Even in the most war torn areas, there are to be no weapons 
in compounds, vehicles, or anywhere else that aid workers may be.83  On the other hand, 
some agencies have allowed guards to stand outside of compounds in certain extreme 
circumstances.  The ICRC, for instance, has begun to post armed guards outside the homes of 
its delegates, its medical depots, and food warehouses.  Interior armed security, however, is 
still banned.84  Without weapons, a humanitarian aid organization’s security depends on the 
understanding or symbol of what their organization represents so that anyone they come 
across will not feel threatened and in turn threaten the security of the aid workers.  Therefore, 
both actual and perceived neutrality must be maintained.   
 
Impartiality 
The second principle, Impartiality, can be defined as, “the allocation of assistance 
based on immediate need alone.”85  Therefore, in the provision of humanitarian assistance, 
race, ethnicity, religion, political or social affiliation, gender or age is not taken into 
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consideration.  Since MSF is also a medical relief organization, it will not provide assistance 
unless it determines that there is a desperate need for medical care.86
The ICRC also adheres to impartiality.  MSF’s disagrees with ICRC’s impartiality 
when it comes to remaining impartial between the “Serb militiaman and the Muslim civilian 
or the machete-wielding Hutu and the Tutsi victim.”87  The ICRC is more tolerant in 
adhering to their principles during a crisis because their mission and mandate are more 
complicated.  Along with caring for those who are sick, the ICRC also serves as an 
intermediary and reunites families with loved ones who were missing.  While they are taking 
into account how their actions might affect the number of sick they are treating, they are also 
forced to take into account these other factors.  MSF has greater liberty to make decisions on 
how to implement its principles purely based on those in the greatest need because of their 
single-minded mission.  It is, therefore, in a better position to speak out and advocate for 
those in need than ICRC is, in particular when it concerns the militarization or politization of 
humanitarian aid.   
In his 1999 speech, James Orbinski stated that “humanitarianism is not a tool to end 
war or to create peace.  It is a citizen response to political failure.”  What is implied in this 
statement is that humanitarianism is not a tool of conflict resolution that should be wielded 
by governments or the international community.  There are limitations that both 
humanitarians themselves and governments should recognize to the humanitarian act.  They 
are not helping to create peace, even though their aid may help to set the concerned parties on 
a right (or wrong) course, but are there to simply save lives.  The language of 
humanitarianism should reflect these limitations and distinguish it from any ‘relief’ aid given 
by governments or government sponsored agencies.   
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Jean-Michel Piedagnel, director of MSF, told the British Medical Journal why the 
concept of a “humanitarian war” is wrong.  The problem starts with language – that the word 
“humanitarian” has become synonymous with charity or assistance.  It has lost its original 
meaning, which is of neutral, impartial, and independent assistance, with no political or 
religious aim.”88  In the past 10-20 years, the use of the word “humanitarian” for political 
concerns has increased.  After the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a multi-polar 
world in which the West has been focused on the spread of democracy, the developed nations 
have often chosen to use ethical language to justify armed intervention.  Promoting the 
concept of a “humanitarian war” is nonsense because soldiers are not sent out for 
humanitarian reasons, but for war.  In fact, government sponsored aid would be better 
described as ‘relief.’     
It is easy to confuse relief aid with humanitarian aid.  Relief aid can be very valuable assistance, given 
to people in different contexts.  However, when it is NOT given SOLEY on the basis of needs and the 
principles of independence, neutrality, and impartiality, it is not humanitarian aid.89
    
Another problem with the coexistence of armies and humanitarian organizations in 
the same area is when the aid begins to come into a country at the same time that government 
forces do.  The citizens there will associate the two together, as has happened with the United 
State’s “humanitarian war” in Afghanistan.  MSF has had a presence there for the past 24 
years and was forced to leave recently after the murder of five staff workers due to their 
perceived association with the United States military presence.90  Piedagnel sees peace-
keeping as a political process as well, something that humanitarian organizations should not 
be involved in.  Their goal is to help the people, not to create peace.  Piedagnel made this 
perfectly clear when asked about long-term reconstruction.  “you have enough politicians, 
 50
enough diplomats, and enough military people to plan that, without asking a humanitarian 
worker…We will not participate in the political settlement in Afghanistan.”91  
 In November of 2004, Dr. Rowan Gillies, President of the MSF International Council, 
spoke on the organization’s concern over the militarization of humanitarian aid in his 
acceptance speech of the King Hussein Humanitarian Leadership Prize.  In response to his 
opinion that Western governments are increasingly using humanitarianism in combination 
with combat attempts, he reminded his audience of what being a humanitarian is NOT and 
what it IS.  It is not about:  
winning the hearts and minds of the people.  It is not about imposing a political or cultural system, 
good or bad and it is not about winning wars or, even, building peace.  It is a visceral and practical 
response of one human being to the suffering of another.  It is an apolitical act and by definition a 
civilian act.92   
 
In southern Afghanistan, however, this is what aid was portrayed to be.  It was made to be 
conditional on the population’s collaboration with US military forces through the distribution 
of leaflets.93  As a result, MSF became closely associated with the United State’s military aid 
and has had to pull out of both Afghanistan and Iraq to due the threat to their staff.  Overall, 
since early 2003, more than thirty international and national aid workers have been killed in 
Afghanistan, the Taliban claiming responsibility for some of the deaths, illustrating the 
dangers of association with political and military agendas and the severely limiting factors it 
creates for providing aid to populations in need.   
 
Independence 
Independence is the third and final principle and the one that is a necessary condition 
for the previous two principles.  If an organization desires to be neutral and impartial, they 
must first have the ability to decide their own priorities.  Independence is essential for 
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humanitarian organizations, in order to ensure that they act exclusively out of concern for 
those in need, free from political, religious, or other influences.  A liberty that results from 
this independence, both political and financial for MSF, is MSF’s ability to go to what they 
call the “10 Most Forgotten Humanitarian Crises of the World” and help those who are 
forgotten.  This past year, the crises such as those in Sudan, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, and Uganda made the list.  In the past ten years, over 3 million people have been 
killed in the Congo because of the civil war conflict.   
MSF’s first aspect of independence is one vis a vis states, international organizations, 
political parties, churches, economic powers, etc.  When working in hostile environments, it 
is an organization’s independence that is most crucial for the warring parties to recognize.  In 
Afghanistan, this independence was clearly compromised.  A Taliban spokesperson once 
offered the following comment, “Organizations like Medecins Sans Frontiers work for 
American interests and are therefore targets for us.”94  A second example is MSF’s work in 
North Korea in the 90s.  MSF was the first independent humanitarian organization to gain 
access in the country in 1995, but ended up leaving only three years later in 1998.  During its 
work, MSF was unable to provide assistance that was free of the North Korean’s government 
influence.95   
The second aspect of MSF’s independence is its financial independence from any 
major donors, such as rich western governments, looking to influence the policies of 
humanitarian organizations for their own interests.  88 percent of MSF’s funding is from 
private sources, leaving less than 15 percent to be donated by large influential organizations 
such as the European Union, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and the 
United States government.96  In comparison, many other large international NGOs receive 
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their funding in exactly the opposite manner; up to 80 percent of their funding can come from 
public sources.  This financial independence allows MSF to set its own objectives and to 
better understand and react to the needs of those objectives.  MSF is well-known to be the 
first medical relief organization to arrive at any international crisis they have deemed a 
medical emergency.  This ability is a result of MSF’s unique capability to go first, get the 
money later.  Others must first wait for financial backing that often comes from governments 
with strong political agendas before it can intervene.  For MSF, being financially 
independent is a necessary reality if they are to be both perceived as and act as an 
independent humanitarian agency.97
Out of the three principles, independence is the most enabling.  It is MSF’s 
independence that allows them to spend money in order to do impartial assessments and to 
assist the most vulnerable in places such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Northern 
Uganda, the Ivory Coast, and all many other places that do not make it to the news headlines.  
Independence allows for them to provide aid based solely on a needs analysis as well as 
speak out about the lack of response to civilian suffering because of war and disease.   
 
Maintenance of Principles 
In order to remain effective, however, independence, impartiality, and neutrality, 
must be safeguarded through MSF remaining distinct from other mere ‘relief’ and not 
‘humanitarian’ agencies and other service providers.  This task, as is evident in recent 
political conflicts and debates, remains extremely difficult.  Many believe, such as Lt. 
General Romeo Dellaire, that it may even be impossible.  Dellaire, who is the general that led 
the peacekeeping mission (UNAMIR) in Rwanda during the genocide, along with others 
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purports an integration of humanitarianism into the political arena.  Nicolas de Torrente, 
President of MSF USA, wholeheartedly disagrees in his article, “Humanitarianism sacrificed: 
Integration’s False Promise,” stating that “merely saving lives” would be sacrificed for 
“higher” yet untenable goals.   
Torrente recognizes the international trend to integrate humanitarianism into the 
political arena, “in the pursuit of a stated goal of comprehensive, durable, and just resolution 
of conflict.”98  Humanitarian aid, in this proposal, would support the “international 
community’s” political objectives.  An implication of this “coherence agenda” is that the 
principles that have long characterized humanitarian aid “should be set aside in order to 
harness aid to the ‘higher’ goals of peace, security, and development.”99
 This is a dangerous trend because it misplaces the use of humanitarian aid.  
Humanitarian organizations must necessarily have different priorities than politically 
motivated governments or groups.  For politicians, an end goal of peace, stability, or 
democracy may be the top priority.  For humanitarians, it is always the immediate relief of 
suffering for those in need.  The vulnerable are always the top priority.  This is not to say that 
humanitarian organizations are, of course, against these end goals of peace, but simply that 
their mission would be jeopardized and miscalculated were they to consider these as well.  
As states common knowledge, it is impossible to do everything at once, most particularly if 
one wishes to be successful.  For this reason, Torrente says that “transforming humanitarian 
action into a presumptive tool of conflict resolution is unjustifiably and unnecessarily 
detrimental to people who suffer the ravages of war.”100  As long as a crisis creates victims, 
humanitarian action carried out independently and impartially to meet their urgent needs 
remains extremely relevant.   
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If the trend to place humanitarianism within the coherence agendas of the 
international community were to be executed, the mission of helping the vulnerable first and 
foremost would be severely hindered in three different ways.  First of all, if aid is used as an 
element to conflict resolution, it is often only given as a reward or denied as a sanction 
according to political principles, thus resulting in avoidable deaths.  Secondly, the priority of 
humanitarians to help those in need is often made to take a back seat to possible unproven 
future benefits that other organizations or governments desire to obtain.  This situation is 
ethically indefensible with the mission statement of a humanitarian.  Thirdly, linking aid with 
the response of the international community to a crisis situation often communicates a false 
reality that the international response is actually serving the best interest of those in need, 
when in actuality, it is their interests they are serving.101
Due to these dangerous associations, it is up to the humanitarian organizations to 
continue to implement the three principles and provide immediate relief to those in need, 
whenever, wherever, and whoever they are.  Instead of undermining humanitarian action by 
untenable and idealist ideas such as peace and justice, the international community should 
rather focus on promoting international humanitarian law and mobilizing resources for 
meaningful assistance, consistently and proportional.102  Finally, it is more crucial now than 
ever before that humanitarian organizations do not ignore their responsibility to publicly 
challenge and hold governments, businesses, and the international community accountable, 
especially if these groups are making it impossible for the humanitarian to meet fulfill his 
responsibilities to the needy.  And that is what MSF is so good at.   
 
Temoignage – “Bearing Witness” 
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 It is MSF’s unique principle of “temoignage” or “bearing witness” that makes it so 
good at intelligently speaking out about injustices they have experienced first hand.  
Whenever possible, MSF volunteers give interviews and make presentations.  MSF’s 
worldwide offices facilitate gatherings of various organizations, individuals, and 
communities for the collaboration of information.  The organization as a whole releases 
publications and gives exhibitions on issues it has deemed important to speak out on, such as 
violations of human rights.103  It not only confronts those in violation of the law, but draws 
the international community into the confrontation by issuing public information to create 
pressure.  For MSF “there isn’t such a distinction between speaking and acting.  I think we 
permanently speak out, in a way.”104
Temoignage is an integral part of MSF’s mission and its medical action.  It illustrates 
that the primary responsibility of the organization is to put the population of people in 
distress as its priority.  This active participation is an act of resistance to violence, 
discrimination, exclusion, etc….for the people.  Temoignage demands that the sole interest 
for the populations in danger is the amelioration of the situation, through medical care and 
bearing witness.  For Kouchner, the Biafra crisis was severely devoid of temoignage, and for 
MSF, the organization’s pull-out from the refugee camps in and around Rwanda after the 
genocide was the boldest move of temoignage yet.  During the Rwandan genocide, MSF 
France published a letter to Mitterand, the French president at the time and an ally of the 
Hutu regime, in Le Monde, the nation’s largest newspaper, attempting to persuade Mitterand 
to accept political responsibility and stop the genocide.  Mitterand did not appreciate the 
letter.105  However, with the pull-out from Rwanda, MSF managed to not only attract 
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international media attention, but a collaborative change of the distribution of aid for the 
remaining NGO’s, hoping to improve the situation.   
Temoignage is not a conservative principle.  Where it has publicly denounced a 
regime, such as Ethiopia or North Korea, MSF has been forced to leave.  Risks of retaliation 
as well as the risk of compromising its neutrality are possible consequences of its actions that 
MSF must take into account if, when, and how it decides to speak out.  Though MSF 
recognizes that publicly denouncing human rights violations should be left up to 
organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, it will use its 
principle of temoignage when medical aid is being abused or not even being distributed at all 
in a crisis or when they are the only witnesses to massive crimes against civilians.106  Its 
advocacy is based on first-hand observation, not reports from other groups, and supported by 
evidence, such as: tracking of disease outbreaks, nutritional surveys, epidemiological data, 
etc…There is even an organization in Paris called Epicentre that MSF created in 1987 to do 
just these tasks for them as well as other organizations.107  For MSF, much of its vitality and 
rebellious nature stems from bearing witness.  Their constant critical analyses of the crisis in 
which they are involved make it a step ahead of most.  Instead of reacting, MSF desires to 
act, and to act loudly.     
 
Realistic view 
 Despite their drive for change, James Orbinski, former President of MSF, stated that 
MSF has a realistic viewpoint about the atmosphere that they operate in.   
Humanitarian action is more than simple generosity, simple charity.  It aims to build spaces of 
normalcy in the midst of what is abnormal.  More than offering material assistance, we aim to enable 
individuals to regain their rights and dignity as human beings.  As an independent volunteer 
association, we are committed to bringing direct medical aid to people in need.  But we act not in a 
vacuum, and we speak not into the wind, but with a clear intent to assist, to provoke change, or to 
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reveal injustice.  Our action and our voice is an act of indignation, a refusal to accept an active or 
passive assault on the other.108
 
Orbinski realizes that after all of these grand political and academic debates that 
humanitarianism has a single-minded mission in reaction to the humanitarian imperative: 
helping those that are in greatest need.  And MSF adds its own twist to this act by telling the 
world what they have seen.  MSF realizes, however, that humanitarianism by itself is not 
enough to solve the problems that create the crises they find their selves in.  Aid agencies are 
no substitute to the action of the international community and agencies, such as the 
multilateral institution of the United Nations, that act for the sake of creating peace, finding 
and rooting out the sources of conflict, protecting human rights, and promoting safe access 
for aid.  As is evident in the term, “international community,” it is a conglomeration, most 
notably of states but also of non-state, actors that are required to fulfill their respective duties 
and responsibilities to the community as a whole and work together in order to promote 
peace and justice.   
 
Conclusion 
The principles of neutrality, impartiality, independence, and temoignage form MSF’s 
core identity.  During MSF’s direct work with patients, within its bureaucracy, and within its 
advocacy for policy change these principles are absolutely essential.  The practical 
implementation of the principles within each area of MSF’s work dictates its actions in both 
the field and the advocacy arena.  Impartiality allows MSF to asses who those in greatest 
need are so that they can make ethically based decisions on their action in the field.  
Independence and neutrality enable access to those in the most need as well as creating the 
trust that is essential to help those who have been betrayed, attacked, or neglected.  The two 
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principles also allow for temoignage, giving MSF the ability to speak out freely about the 
unjust conditions in the field or in the policy arena, helping to change the status quo.  In the 
end, each of the foundational principles allows MSF to carry out its ultimate objective: to 
help those most in need of medical assistance, now.   
 Finally, MSF is not naïve about the frailty of the humanitarian position within the 
international community.  They fully recognize that “the humanitarian aid worker is not a 
powerful negotiating partner.  We come to the table with no force of arms.  We offer 
practical assistance to those in need.”109  However, they are aware that it is only through the 
maintenance of these principles both in the field as well as within the perception of the 
international community that will allow humanitarianism to continue.  There will always be a 
need for humanitarians, but their ability to exist is ultimately dependent on each and every 
other actor in a crisis respecting the boundaries and principles that have been established.   
Maintenance of these three principles requires that there is increased respect for international 
humanitarian law, and that states refrain from labeling activities of their military as 
humanitarian.  “Pretending that humanitarian action is a way to meet political goals is as 
erroneous as pretending that humanitarian actors can provide political solutions.”110  For 
MSF, this is precisely why they confront power and make it clear that there is no desire to 
ever be a part of it through their policy of temoignage.  Their goal is to “merely” save lives. 
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Chapter 5: HIV/AIDS Prevention and Treatment in Kenya 
 
 
“They are not Gods though they would like to be; 
 they are only human trying to fix up a human.” 
 
- Anne Sexton, “Doctors”  
 
 
MSF became involved in the fight against HIV/AIDS in Africa in the early 1990s and 
has been in Kenya since 1997.  The medical relief organization has been focusing its long-
term solution to alleviating the medical crisis of HIV/AIDS in two areas: first, by 
campaigning to tear down obstacles hindering access to antiretroviral treatment that were 
previously thought to be insurmountable and second, by providing effective quality medical 
treatment to patients with HIV/AIDS in resource poor settings.  These two goals are rooted in 
MSF’s long-standing commitment to bearing witness and providing medical treatment.  In 
this case, MSF’s campaign to essential medicines was deemed necessary for the 
accomplishment of the second goal, providing effective medical care to those in need.  With 
successful project sites in Nairobi, Busia and Homa Bay, MSF continues to expand.  It is 
determined to have the ability to treat more and therefore has embarked on an enormous 
“Access to Essential Medicines” campaign that works to reduce the price of drugs and 
increase access for those in the most need in developing countries.     
It is clear that the epidemic of HIV/AIDS is not a medical emergency in the sense that 
it has not been caused by any outright conflict or direct violence yet the epidemic, along with 
pervasive infectious diseases, such as malaria, tuberculosis, and sleeping sickness, causes 
millions of violent deaths every year.  The international community has failed to respond 
adequately to the health crisis, and because of its inaction has caused a “war of silence” to 
erupt which has in turn created an emergency medical crisis.  Unfortunately, this emergency 
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and lack of commitment to help has persisted for so long at this point that millions dying 
every year from lack of access to healthcare has become “normal.”  How this urgent situation 
become so unmanageable to the point of a long-term medical emergency and yet remained so 
blind to the eye of the developed world?  Thankfully, MSF is an organization that is 
dedicated to combating the crisis of HIV/AIDS, and their response has been two-fold: 
bearing witness to the political vacuum and providing clinical care and treatment.   
 
Kenya and AIDS 
Often considered East Africa’s powerhouse and most stable country, Kenya is not 
without its ominous threats to stability.  Although it has crucial needs for constitutional 
reform, debt relief, and economic development, what happens in Kenya concerning its battle 
with HIV/AIDS will be foundational in determining the country’s long-term stability.  It was 
in the mid 90s that MSF decided to set up shop when it recognized the plight of the Kenyans 
and their need for a long-term solution that was based around the prevention, care and 
treatment of the disease.  As the Kenyan society suffers because of the far-reaching effects of 
AIDS, the dedicated work of the MSF volunteers has fought for radical change that would 
impact the life of every individual living with the virus.  MSF’s efforts have been 
concentrated within Kenyan politics and its three different clinical sites and therapy 
programs.  For the organization as a whole, the principles that it is based on take an 
extremely important role in determining what it gets involved in as well as how it gets 
involved.  Kenya, in particular, has been a great example of the MSF’s activist and creative 
bent towards solving a problem that much of the world sees as insurmountable.   
It is estimated that approximately 2.2 million people in Kenya are living with 
HIV/AIDS, with about 13 percent of the adult population testing positive.  While Europe and 
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America have experienced an 80 percent decrease in the mortality rate of AIDS because of 
access to life-prolonging antiretroviral (ARV) drugs, around 700 Kenyans continue to die 
every day from the disease.111  In Kenya, HIV/AIDS remains a death sentence – and not only 
to its victims.  Since there is such a significant number infected from the adult population - 
seven out of ten HIV-positive Kenyans are 18-25 years old - there are also far-reaching 
socioeconomic effects which hinder the growth and development of upcoming generations as 
well as the care for the elderly.  As the working age generation becomes sicker and sicker, 
production decreases, profits erode, and GDP will decrease by 14percent in 2005.112       
MSF has been providing HIV/AIDS treatment in Africa since the mid-1990s with its 
first program in South Africa.  Its programs and clinics are run in city slums as well as 
remote rural areas, offering a comprehensive care package to its patients.  More than half of 
the HIV/AIDS patients are women of child-bearing age or children.  Currently, MSF 
provides ARV treatment to more than 23,000 patients in 27 countries, which is a 150 percent 
increase compared to December of last year when MSF was treating 9,000 patients in 22 
countries.113  MSF chose Kenya as a pilot program to demonstrate the efficacy of anti-
retroviral (ARV) treatment because of the country’s significant level of HIV prevalence, high 
rates of infection, and resource poor setting.114  Better known in Swahili as “Madaktari wasio 
na Mipaka,” MSF’s presence has had a significant impact on the care and treatment of 
HIV/AIDS patients largely because of its decisive activist stand which stems from its 
foundational principles as well as its organization wide “Access to Essential Medicines 
Campaign.”  Advocacy within the MSF “temoinage” movement has been a part of its long-
standing principle but in recent years, these advocacy campaigns have focused on individual 
issues with universal themes, the most prominent of which is MSF’s access campaign. 
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 Access to Essential Medicines Campaign 
 Out of six million people that immediately need antiretroviral (ARV) treatment in 
developing countries, only 440,000 currently have access to it.115  The campaign has existed 
since 1999 because one-third of the world’s population today (rising to one-half in the 
poorest parts of the world) lack access to essential medicines, either because they are too 
expensive or they are no longer produced.  As a humanitarian organization, it is 
fundamentally unacceptable to MSF and its organizational principles and values that this 
access is increasingly impossible, most particularly for the most common global infectious 
diseases, such as malaria and tuberculosis (TB), or HIV/AIDS.116  MSF is committed to 
raising awareness or bearing witness in crisis situations; being the voice of the vulnerable 
when no one else is speaking for them.  Therefore, the aim of MSF’s Access to Essential 
Medicines Campaign is simply to increase the number of people that have access to 
treatment.  Some examples of MSF’s policy and advocacy work can be found in its articles 
on its website specifically made for the campaign.  Titles include: “Access to AIDS Care 
Increasing at Snail’s Pace,” “MSF Challenges Ministerial Summit on Health Research to 
Ensure Development of New Medicines,” and “Access to Medicines at Risk Across the 
Globe: What to Watch out for in the Free Trade Agreements with the United States.”117  
Because of the needs of the developing world for access to healthcare, MSF has expanded 
upon its foundation of emergency medical relief by developing long-term solutions to this 
crisis.  The campaign is based on three pillars which reflect the overall goals of MSF: 
overcoming access barriers, such as lowering the prices of medicines and bringing 
abandoned drugs back into the market, globalization, and stimulating research and 
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development.  In general, MSF supports solutions to these problems that include encouraging 
generic competition, voluntary discounts on branded drugs, global procurement, and local 
production.118
The first pillar of the campaign is “overcoming access barriers.”  The barriers are 
created for one of two reasons: either the drugs were not profitable enough so manufacturers 
ceased to produce or improve them, or they are too expensive for developing countries to 
afford.  By overcoming these barriers, those in the developing world that are in need of life-
saving medicines will have increased access to them.  MSF has four different strategies to 
attain this goal.  The first is to conduct global price analyses of selected essential drugs that 
are too expensive, such as fluconazole and ciprofloxacin, which will enable better negotiation 
for price changes.  Second, MSF studies the quality of all sources of select expensive drugs 
in order to identify high-quality low-cost producers.  Third, reflecting its willingness to help 
those who want to help themselves, MSF works to support health ministries that are fighting 
to increase their own country’s access to essential drugs.  Finally, in regards to abandoned 
drugs, MSF works with the World Health Organization (WHO) and drug industry, 
advocating for the restart of manufacturing of those drugs.119   
 The second pillar to MSF’s access campaign is “globalization.”  With this pillar, MSF 
aims to influence the direction in which globalization happens, specifically concerning 
medicines.  Its goal is to improve developing countries’ access to medicine by supporting 
good-quality local production of medicines or the importation of those less expensive.  
Secondly, MSF advocates for existing international trade rules, such as the TRIPS 
agreement, to be implemented as they were designed – to protect people’s access to essential 
goods such as life-saving medicines.  To do this, countries need to have appropriate laws, 
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which is why MSF is also dedicated to working with willing governments towards improving 
their public health.120  The global trade system, with the WTO at its center, has set the rules 
for the buying and selling of products, including medicines.  MSF sees medicines being 
treated in the same light as a product such as steel as unacceptable because the result is 
market monopolies for large pharmaceutical companies which result in high pricing of the 
drugs and consequently, the inability of those in the developing world to extend, improve, or 
save their lives.  In order to be successful, MSF has developed three strategies.  First, it 
provides evidence about the harmful effects that strong patent protection has on poor 
countries.  For example, some patented drugs are more expensive in poor countries than in 
Europe and America.121  Second, MSF organizes events in order to mobilize advocacy 
groups, drug industry, international organizations, and governments to use legal measures, 
such as compulsory licensing and parallel imports, to help poor countries.  Third, through 
providing information, MSF seeks to specifically influence European Union (EU) and United 
States policy concerning trade agreements and their impact on access to essential medicines. 
 Not only are new drugs too expensive, but the health needs of the poor are being 
ignored.  That is why MSF’s third pillar for the campaign is to “stimulate research and 
development (R&D) for neglected diseases,” such as tuberculosis, malaria, and sleeping 
sickness.  MSF is demanding from governments, drug industry, international organizations, 
and nongovernmental organizations that each one separately, as well as all together, invests 
in the development of effective, affordable, and easy-to-use medicines for these diseases.  
Between 1975 and 1999 only 13 out of 1,393 new drugs developed (1 percent) were to treat 
tropical diseases, which account for over 9 percent of the worldwide disease burden.122  90 
percent of the money spent on health research is spent on the health problems of less than 10 
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percent of the world’s population.123Those diseases which have experienced investment are 
known as “lifestyle” diseases in rich western countries.   
We research on drugs to grow hair, relieve impotence and fight cholesterol, ulcers, depression, anxiety 
and high blood pressure when cholera is wiping out people in western Kenya.  We spend billions to 
market a new obesity drug rather than pioneer a new malaria treatment.124   
Since R&D is almost entirely within the private sector, it is driven by the prospect for profit 
instead of public health concerns.  In fact, some of the pills for infectious diseases are so old 
that an MSF nurse working in Angola said that, “some of our patients are more afraid of 
dying from the treatment than of dying from the disease.”125  The nurse was speaking of a 55 
year-old pill for sleeping sickness that burns the veins and kills one in 20 patients.  MSF aims 
to accomplish its third pillar with increased funding, investing in the R&D capabilities of 
developing countries, and supporting alternative models for R&D.  For example, with 
“abandoned drugs” or those that have not had any new research for quite some time, MSF 
lobbies governments and companies to renew production of the unprofitable drugs that are 
sorely needed in resource poor settings.126  The organization now tells governments that they 
have a duty to force the pharmaceutical multinationals to turn their attention to abandoned 
diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and sleeping sickness.127  MSF’s advocacy also 
includes: revealing its own experience of ineffective old drugs; raising awareness about the 
lack of R&D being allocated to abandoned drugs; and convincing policy-makers in large, 
powerful western countries, international organizations, and researchers of the need for a 
shift in the paradigm to a need-driven global R&D agenda, which would include creating 
new mechanisms for funding such endeavors.128
Although these next two priorities are not considered by MSF to be “pillars” of the 
campaign, they are most certainly the goals that the pillars aim to accomplish.  The first is 
developing a long-term and substantial solution towards AIDS.  At its foundation, MSF 
 66
recognizes the ethical imperative to help those being deprived of dignity.  MSF’s detailed, 
long-term, and political access campaign was developed for the same reason that it embarks 
on each medical relief emergency -they are there to help those who are sick and without the 
means to be healed.  In regards to HIV/AIDS, this long-term solution must include the 
combination of prevention and treatment.  These priorities and goals are way too large for 
MSF to accomplish by itself.  Thus, it has invited many actors from all levels of communities 
to come out and take up their responsibility.  From the field, the healthcare providers have an 
immediate responsibility to demand the best possible quality of care for their patients.  Local 
and national governments are responsible for promoting and passing public health legislation 
to increase the value and reach of available healthcare for their citizens.  International 
organizations, such as the Global Fund, the World Bank, and UNAIDS should focus on 
protecting and aiding public health by adopting and advocating for new policies.  Large 
pharmaceutical companies must cut prices for developing countries in a transparent and 
predictable way as well as support further R&D for neglected diseases.  Funding should be 
provided by international donors for drug purchasing and treatment programs in addition to 
prevention.  Finally, and possibly the most important stimulus, civil society must monitor, 
expose, demand from, and hold accountable each of these actors.129 For MSF, the Global 
Fund should play an intricate part in helping to promote these priorities.   
 
TRIPS 
 As the discussion on patent rights rages within the international community, the 
chairman of CIPLA, an Indian pharmaceutical company that produces cheap generic drugs, 
has interesting insights.  Yusuf Hamied has offered free drugs to MSF, which it gladly took, 
 67
but his offer to Third World governments for free technology to produce their own anti-AIDS 
drugs has been left standing.  So has his offer to his own government to provide free drugs to 
prevent mother-to-child transmission.130  When asked about what the Indian government 
should do to prepare for 2005, Mr. Hamied said that unless the patent rules of the WTO are 
changed, India should get out.  “If somebody wants something I’ve got, they can have it 
regardless of GATT or the WTO,” he said.131
As we begin the WTO’s new implementations of the TRIPS agreement, which started 
in January 2005, MSF is anxious that a lot of the work that has been done for cheap 
affordable access to essential medicines will in essence be undone.  For example, the generic 
production of ARVs from CIPLA will likely be undermined with the new implementation 
rules, as after 2005 CIPLA will no longer be able to copy any drugs it does not have a 
process patent on.132  This concern is not without merit.  Take the possible Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA) agreement, for example.  If agreed upon, the FTAA will increase 
the restrictions on intellectual property rights which will decrease the competition that large 
pharmaceutical companies have to face, increasing their monopoly rights.  Generic 
competition will essentially be blocked, giving little hope to further the lowering of prices 
and the provision for greater access to them for those in need, therefore hurting the health of 
the people in developing countries significantly.133  The bi-lateral agreement could set a 
precedence of undermining the possibilities of protection currently in place within the TRIPS 
agreement, having negative effects on developing countries around the world.   
 
Access Campaign in Kenya 
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 In Kenya, MSF’s Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines has had a multi-
sectoral approach that has resulted in significant influence and change within the government 
and MSF’s own clinics in the country.  During its campaign, MSF has been dedicated to 
lobbying pharmaceutical manufacturers, distributors and the Kenyan government for more 
affordable AIDS medicines and increased access to them.  
 In June of 2001, at a MSF-sponsored discussion called “Dying from Lack of 
Treatment: The International AIDS Crisis,” Dr. Chris Ouma, a former MSF director of the 
Nairobi clinics and a Kenyan himself, spoke out about the five biggest problems in Kenya 
that continued to drive the AIDS epidemic.  The biggest problem, Ouma said, continues to be 
the unwillingness that people have to even talk about HIV/AIDS.  The second is poverty and 
ignorance; people cannot afford the medical treatment nor do they even know what they may 
need because they are too poor to afford education.  These first two problems seem even by 
themselves to be insurmountable.  Yet Ouma goes on to talk about mother-to-child 
transmission, the serious lack of leadership, especially political, and finally cultural beliefs 
and practices, all of which significantly contribute to the spread of HIV/AIDS in Kenya.134  
MSF has not become overwhelmed, however, and has instead continued to push for reform, 
maintaining its value of “bearing witness.”  For instance, one of the fundamental principles 
that MSF Kenya has had first on its agenda to be widely accepted as fact is the mutual 
dependence and synergy between prevention and treatment. 
 
Kenyan Government influence 
MSF is working in Kenya because the government has expressed interest in restructuring 
its public health system to make it stable and self-sufficient.  For example, based on national 
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AIDS policy, the government plans to implement interventions such as: strengthen the 
infrastructure for the management of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and opportunistic 
infections; strengthen community-based health care through the involvement of individuals, 
families, and communities; and manage and coordinate HIV/AIDS programs using a multi-
sectoral approach.135
With these stated initiatives, the government overturned its previous policy which did not 
even recognize the presence of HIV/AIDS in Kenya until 1987 when a National AIDS 
Control Program (NACP) was established.  However, not until 1997 did the government 
truly increase its commitment to alleviating the effects of the disease by passing a multi-
sectoral national AIDS policy (Sessional Paper No. 4 on HIV/AIDS) that would last 15 years 
(its initiatives are stated above).  Only last year, did the Kenyan government pass a National 
Development Plan for 2003-2007.  In 2001, the government held a week-long workshop with 
16 heads of units from various ministries aimed at developing an HIV/AIDS curriculum to be 
incorporated into the activities of the ministers.136  It was the first step towards a capacity 
building program that would empower all sectors of the government to play an active role in 
the AIDS crisis. 
 Skepticism on how much effort and dedication the government is really willing to put 
forth lingers as it remains inactive on many critical legal, ethical, and cultural issues 
concerning the virus and supplies insufficient means and funds.  For example, the Kenyan 
government spends more on its national debt than it does education and health combined.  
This lack of active political will and, consequently, lack of dedicated resources is one of the 
greatest barriers that MSF is fighting to overturn.  Changing this attitude of the government is 
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crucial if MSF is to achieve its goal of a stable and self-sufficient public health system in 
Kenya.     
 
TRIPS in Kenya 
 As previously discussed, in 2005 the promised stricter implementations of the TRIPS 
agreement in the WTO has the potential to further limit access to medicines for developing 
countries.  MSF has been aware of this possibility and was the main stimulus and 
determining advocate in the past five years towards passing a patent law that would help to 
benefit and protect the Kenyan people from these new implementations.  Actually the 
national Industrial Property Bill, initiated by the Kenyan government, began asking for more 
restrictions than TRIPS required on patent laws since Kenya originally obtained its advice 
from the WTO.  Fortunately, MSF was successful in completely changing its direction.  In 
August of 2002, MSF’s lobbying, advocacy, organizing, mobilizing, media briefs, and 
petitioning with the Kenyan Coalition for Access to Essential Medicines paid off when the 
government signed into law the Industrial Property Act Bill of 2001, a progressive patent law 
permitting compulsory licensing and parallel importation.137  Compulsory licensing is a 
provision that allows for public authorities to grant licenses to a third party without the 
consent of the patent holder but the patent holders still receive compensation.  The licenses 
may be issued in the interest of public health and are a common feature to patent law.  It is 
neither a legal loophole nor a form of pirating, but rather a power granted to the government 
so that it may counter the negative effects that patents may have on public interests.138  
Parallel importation is the importation of patented products without the approval of the patent 
holder.  It allows a country the opportunity to find the best price of a branded drug on the 
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market, but does not involve the purchase of generics.  For example, Kenya would have an 
interest in parallel importation from India of ciprofloxacin if the drug from Bayer were sold 
in country for more than it was sold in India.  The lower price in India would be due to 
generic competition there.139  Both of these provisions are allowed by the TRIPS agreement 
and help to protect Kenya from any further tightening of restrictions that may hinder its 
access to medicines.  This new bill is often seen by Kenyans as the “Patient Rights over 
Patent Rights” bill because the civil society of Kenya, represented through the Kenyan 
Coalition for Access to Essential Medicines, started by and maintained by MSF, was able to 
place enough pressure on the government to affect change.  In the end, the passage of this bill 
is hopefully the means to the basic right to health, allowing cheap, quality treatment, tipping 
the balance back from favoring corporate protection of patents and profit margins.   
 
Kenyan Access to Essential Medicine Coalition influence 
 Since MSF has been in Kenya, one of the most important achievements it has 
accomplished is the extensive collaboration between all different types of NGOs and 
community organizations through similar interests and concrete goals.  The main goals of the 
coalition have been to encourage and pressure the national treatment policy for HIV/AIDS 
towards actual implementation, advocacy for generic production of drugs within Kenya, the 
reduction of stigma that is still related towards AIDS, and education about HIV/AIDS to 
children and the general public.  The Kenyan Coalition for Access to Essential Medicines 
members include, but are not limited to: Action Aid, The Association of People Living with 
AIDS, Women Fighting AIDS in Kenya, Nyumbani, International Federation of Women 
Lawyers, Kenyan Medical Association, and MSF themselves. 
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 An example in which MSF provided an arena as well as a lot of political pressure for 
the Kenyan government to take a stand on its AIDS policy was in April of 2003 when it 
organized a symposium on ARV treatment.  Everyone was represented: researchers, doctors, 
OMS (organization mondiale de la sante), various medical NGOs, private sector actors, and 
patients living with the disease.  It was an opportunity for all the actors concerned with the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic in Kenya to discuss and develop concrete action plans for their 
responses to the crisis.140 It was at that time, the government of Kenya announced target 
figures for ARV treatment to reach 20 percent of AIDS patients in need of ARVs by 2005 
and 50-60 percent by 2008.141  In order to accomplish this goal, the government proposed 
opening 15 establishments around the country, but no further information on how it was to 
accomplish any of this was given.142  In reaction, MSF is advocating for the government to 
hold to its promises, demanding action from any concerned actors.   
 
Drug Prices 
 As is widely known, in part because of MSF’s access campaign worldwide, in order 
to significantly increase access to medicines for developing countries worldwide, the prices 
of the drugs need to be lowered.  Kenya’s patent bill will help the country to protect itself 
from any further restrictions the WTO may place on the TRIPS agreement in 2005, but this 
does not take away the necessity of advocating for permanently lower drug prices.  And once 
again, MSF has taken up the challenge.  There have been lots of tests in the fight so far, 
including false promises for price deductions and a lack of transparency within the 
negotiations over price changes. 
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 In late 2000 and early 2001, the Kenyan government, UNAIDS, and five 
multinational pharmaceutical companies took up negotiations to lower the price of ARVs in 
Kenya.  Ms. Indra Van Ginsbergen, MSF’s drug campaigner for Kenya, said about the 
negotiations to lower prices in 2000 that, “drug companies and health ministries have so far 
been characterized by a lack of transparency, lots of puff PR from these companies, and very 
little real action.”143  The negotiations were carried out behind closed doors, with no reports 
on what was being done.  Doctors, for instance, were receiving faxes of price reduction in 
ARV treatment, direct from companies, with no other information being offered.144  Given 
the fact that AIDS drugs must be taken for a lifetime and the negotiations were likely to have 
a lasting impact on the price of those drugs, the coalition, representing AIDS patients, civil 
society, and medical associations, demanded more transparency.   
During this time, Ms. Van Ginsbergen, MSF, and the coalition were lobbying for the 
companies to grant voluntary licensing, which would grant Kenyan manufacturers the ability 
to produce generic medicines in country.  MSF began to advocate this position after their 
research had shown that other countries that had not waited for pharmaceutical companies to 
lower prices but had voluntary licensing had been able to significantly reduce the cost of 
AIDS medicines.145  For instance, Brazil has over 90,000 people on free dual and triple drug 
combination treatment programs, possible only because of government dedication and 
nationally produced generic drugs, while Kenya has only about 1,000 people on such 
treatment largely because of the high costs of drugs.146   
In terms of permanent price deduction, the coalition pressured the government to not 
trade long-term rights for access in order to obtain short-term deductions.  While looking to 
reduce the price of ARVs by 85 percent in a deal with five pharmaceutical multinationals, the 
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coalition encouraged the government to not forget about CIPLA’s offer to provide US quality 
approved ARVs at an even lower cost than the one the companies were proposing.147  The 
CIPLA drugs could be legally imported under the Kenyan Industrial Property Act of 1989 
since it was considered to be a vital public interest.  Therefore, any short-term price cuts 
being negotiated that would take away this right of generic importation in the long-term were 
not worth it.  Duly noted by the coalition, the negotiations on price with the companies had 
coincided with the Kenyan government’s decisions to discuss a new Industrial Property Bill, 
in 2000.148  Even with a significant drop, however, the proposed cost per year per patient was 
completely out of reach for the average Kenyan.  In reaction to these debates, MSF stated 
that price cuts were not the answer and were, “just a tool of multi-nationals to try and stop 
Africa producing its own drugs.”149     
 Certain organizations that are members of the coalition along with MSF, or even 
individual activists, have also taken a stand towards lowering the price of ARVs.  Father 
D’Agostino of Nyumbani Wa Toto Wa Mungu Orphanage, a member of the coalition, stated 
during the negations that it would not wait any longer for multinational price reductions and 
was importing a donation of AZT given by the Brazilian government which would benefit 76 
orphans.150  MSF expressed its support for the initiative taken by Father D’Agostino in 
importing the generic drugs.151  In May of 2001, AIDS activists targeted Members of 
Parliament (MP) in their criticisms, holding a two day vigil outside parliament to monitor the 
MP’s activities.152  Dr. Chris Ouma, who is now the ActionAIDS’s national coordinator, 
pressured the MPs to “think about the plight of their people” as they were being handed the 
power to alleviate their suffering.153   
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While MSF has helped to organize and provide the arenas for these particular 
activists, some of its most important work is done in the field, with its patients.  The ground 
zero and crucial foundation for MSF’s activism and value of bearing witness is the 
information and experiences that it gathers through its doctors, logisticians, and 
administrators in the field.  Without this vital element, MSF would not be the civil society 
based grassroots organization with a global impact that it is today.  Its field operations for 
HIV/AIDS are run through its clinics and local community based organizations.     
  
MSF Clinics in Kenya 
 In general, when MSF decides to enter into a field site, its operations include: an 
exploratory evaluation of the site and its needs, training and supervision of medical 
personnel, water and sanitation improvement, data collection, feeding, patient care 
(especially maternal and pediatric), distribution of drugs and medical supplies, and 
rehabilitation of hospitals and clinics.  Depending on the specific needs of the site, a field 
operation may also include massive vaccination campaigns, mental health care, and 
HIV/AIDS care and prevention.154  Currently, MSF has three main field sites in Kenya 
running HIV/AIDS care and prevention programs.  These sites are Homa Bay, Busia, and 
Nairobi.   
 
Homa Bay 
A town off the shore of Lake Victoria and on the northwest Border of Kenya, Homa 
Bay has one of the highest prevalence rates of HIV in Africa – around 35 percent of the adult 
population.155  The high infection rate is due especially to the fact that it is a high-traffic area, 
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with a significant amount of the infections having an origin in the fishing and transport 
industries.156  The clinic in Homa Bay has several main offerings, with the aim of increasing 
the quality of care for those who are infected and to lower the risk of contracting 
opportunistic infections.157  The focus for the program is a free AIDS & TB treatment 
program.  The ARV therapy for Homa Bay was secured in collaboration with the Ministry of 
Health in February 2001 and treatment began that November.  Currently, the clinic serves 
about 400 patients, which is double the amount from 2002, and has proven successful in 
slowing down the effects of AIDS and sometimes even taking away the effects altogether.158  
The patients are residents of Homa Bay and are selected by medical and social criteria, 
usually focusing on those who are the closest to death.  Within its 2003-2004 Activity 
Report, MSF France stated that the program is characterized by reorganization since it is 
capable of integrating about 100 more patients per month into its multi-therapy ARV 
program.159  With this significantly increased capability, the objective of the ARV-treatment 
program is to put all those in need of the therapy on ARVs.  Other principle objectives 
include, but are not limited to: increasing the number of children on ARV treatment, 
guaranteeing safe blood transfusions, and evaluating the activities of the mother-to-child 
transmission prevention program.160  The program is run in collaboration with the Ministry 
of Health and other community organizations.  
 Prior to the ARV-treatment program, activities for the clinic already included: a 
voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) center, treatment of opportunistic diseases, home-
based care for AIDS patients, prevention of mother-to-child transmission, and education in 
schools for prevention.  Other offerings of the program in Homa Bay that are not 
immediately associated with MSF’s HIV/AIDS campaign include: TB prevention, 
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professional training for nurses, pharmaceutical dispensary development, and the 
rehabilitation of the District Hospital with clean water supplies for improving hygienic 
conditions.   
 
Busia 
MSF has also run a clinic in Busia, a town further north than Homa Bay and on the 
Ugandan border, since 2000.  Busia’s HIV prevalence rate increased from 17.1 percent in 
1990 to official figures varying between 34 percent in 1999 and 22 percent in 2000.161  Thus, 
the goal of the MSF program there is for HIV/AIDS prevention education through school 
programs, such as anti-AIDS clubs, which attempt to break the stigma surrounding the 
disease and dispel myths about its transmission.162  Many teachers have been trained on the 
national HIV/AIDS curriculum for primary schools, helping to reinforce the message of 
MSF’s anti-AIDS clubs of prevention.  Activities for these clubs might include, for example, 
a drama piece performed by the students aimed at sensitizing them about the treatment for 
AIDS.163  Other members of the community, such as religious leaders, parents, and village 
elders have also been a significant part of the effort.  This grassroots campaign has been 
unique to the Busia clinic whereas the HIV/AIDS care and treatment is seen at each site in 
slightly different forms and operations.   
For those already affected by HIV/AIDS, MSF has a Preventative Care Clinic at the 
Busia District Hospital.  The clinic is there to give services that include medicine to reduce 
the incidence of opportunistic diseases, patient screening, and counseling services.  In 2003, 
MSF’s commitment to AIDS treatment in Busia was significantly augmented with the 
addition of an AIDS & TB treatment clinic, similar to the one in Homa Bay, which carries 
 78
out free testing, treatment and home-based care.  At the opening of the clinic, MSF illustrated 
its dedication to working with local and national leaders as the District Commissioner of 
Busia, the Mayor of Busia, and the Head of Mission for MSF all spoke.    
 
Nairobi 
 MSF has multiple clinics throughout the capital city of Nairobi which are entirely 
concentrated within the cities numerous slum areas.  There are programs in the slums of 
Mathare, Dandora, and Kibera that have been initiated in collaboration with other local 
organizations in order to reduce the transmission rates within the densest parts of the country.  
In addition, MSF also runs prevention, care, and testing programs in Mbagathi hospital at the 
edge of the Kibera slum.  The focus for all the sites up until recently had been on primary 
health care and HIV-transmission prevention education.  Two examples of this care are in-
residence care of patients and prevention from mother-to-child transmission (now the leading 
cause of death for children under 5 across Africa).    
 Nairobi’s ARV-treatment program began in the Blue House in the slums of Mathare 
in April of 2003.  It currently serves over 700 patients, has about 150 of them on ARV-
treatment, and provides counseling for over 80 patients per day.  Its goals in expanding the 
program include increasing the number of patients on ARV-treatment and evaluating the 
possibility of starting a mother-to-child transmission prevention program.164   
While each clinic has its own focus, MSF Kenya in general has learned several 
important lessons in expanding AIDS treatment in the past few years that has led to a sharp 
increase of the amount of patients treated.  The uses of simplified treatment regimens that are 
adapted to the needs of the poor, such as one-a-day pill programs, have been successful.  For 
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example, adherence rates, critical for slowing any development in drug resistance, have risen 
close to the level of western countries with new simple program designs in which MSF offers 
free treatment, support, and education.165  MSF Dr. Morten Rostrup, President of MSF’s 
International Council, told reporters in Nairobi that, “to scale up treatment on a large scale, 
we have to adapt treatment models to real life.  Adaptation means fewer pills per day, fewer 
lab tests, and free treatment, dispensed in the communities where people live, that is at 
district facilities and at community health posts.”166  For example, treatment programs are 
now based on clinical diagnosis and not lab tests.167  For a long time, people had thought, 
and still do think, that ARV treatment was too “complex, sophisticated, and technical” for 
poor and rural communities, but MSF has shown otherwise with its patients in the slums of 
Kenya.  MSF stresses, however, that the success of the ARV-treatment programs is 
dependent upon the treatment being free for those it treats.  If it were not free, those who 
need it would not be able to afford it on a consistent basis or even at all, as an average cost 
for therapy for one year is $270 US.168
 
Home-Based Care Model   
 
 While the clinics that MSF runs in Homa Bay, Busia, and Nairobi help to provide part 
of the much needed infrastructure that is absolutely vital in combating HIV/AIDS and their 
advocacy campaign helps to raise awareness and disseminate information in order to 
persuade people into action, it is the home-based care (HBC) model that most actively 
combats the crisis of access to medical care on a day to day basis with the victims of 
HIV/AIDS.  The majority of families do not have immediate access to healthcare facilities 
and the spread of the disease has only compounded this problem.  With the HBC model, 
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MSF has sought to attend to the area most lacking in the HIV/AIDS campaign in Kenya - 
provision of proper medical care in resource poor settings.  In fact, up to one third to one half 
of all health and education services are provided by the NGO community in Kenya.169  MSF, 
for example, is the only medical organization offering Anti-retroviral Therapy (ART) in both 
Homa Bay and Busia.170  Providing HBC allows the sick to obtain quality treatment on a 
regular basis without having to travel back and forth from a medical facility, thus helping to 
relieve some of the pressure on over-crowded hospitals as well as providing medical access 
to those that lack the infrastructure needed.  
  MSF’s clinics and home-based care help to provide much needed treatment to those 
who are already sick as they continue to fight and advocate for prevention in the global 
debate through increased education, infrastructure, and funds.  For MSF, treatment and 
prevention are mutually reinforcing tactics that should be implemented simultaneously.  
Employing a “treatment/prevention synergy,” such as the combination of the Access 
Campaign and HBC, is the most effective strategy in combating the humanitarian crises that 
arise from AIDS and the disease itself.171   
HIV prevention and treatment for people with HIV and AIDS are not mutually exclusive options.  On 
the contrary, a rowing body of evidence suggests that the availability of treatment actually advances 
prevention goals.  Prevention and treatment support each other.172
 
Each of the ART programs in Homa Bay, Busia, and Nairobi have shown a marked increase 
in health, very low default rates, and decreased stigma.  Also, the maintenance of this 
program seems both plausible and sustainable in low-income areas of the world.173   
 The model of home-based care is specialized to be a bottom-up community-based 
capacity building program, particularly for low-income settings.  It is a grassroots foundation 
that is meant to connect the community to the greater network of formal health sector 
infrastructure while also shifting the provision of service away from the government to create 
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more efficient and cheaper results.  The HBC model also focuses on improving the quality of 
life for people living with AIDS (PeopleLivingWitHAids) on both a physical and social 
level.174  In Kenya, the national HBC model has four main components: clinical care, nursing 
care, counseling and psycho-spiritual care, and social support.  The clinical care includes 
diagnosis, treatment, and planning for regular follow-up care. The nursing care encourages 
good health, nutrition, and hygiene. The counseling support helps the patient make informed 
decisions, is used as a mechanism for creating behavior change, and helps to reduce stress, 
anxiety, or depression that is correlated with the disease. The social care is for welfare 
support for both the infected and the affected members of the family or the greater 
community.  The model also outlines the caregiver as part of a team that works with patient, 
the family members, and the health worker on many levels in the home, in the clinic, and in 
the hospital.175  This model gives a theoretical advantage towards a long-term disease, such 
as HIV/AIDS, because it provides lasting access to treatment in areas of high poverty and 
lack of transportation.  Also, due to the individual care that each patient is given, diets, 
family dynamics, and the condition of the home are all factors to the disease that can be 
observed and taken into consideration by the community health worker or volunteer.176  As 
hospital wards continue to overflow, with multiple people sharing beds, with people staying 
for up to three months because of long-term diseases, and with AIDS patients occupying 
about 80 percent of the medical wards in certain areas, the success of the HBC model in 
Kenya is necessary in order to provide medical access to the majority who need it.177   
 The model of HBC that MSF employs is not the only model that is used in Kenya.  In 
fact, in order to examine how and why it is both useful and effective, it is important to 
compare and contrast it to another model that Mild May International created to work in 
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collaboration with the Ministry of Health (MOH) in Kenya and the National AIDS and STD 
Committee Program.  The program is called HAPAC (HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care).   
This initiative emphasizes the follow-up of a discharged patient with a HBC Coordinator in 
each district.  These individuals are selected and trained and then in turn are in charge of 
training the community health workers and caregivers.  In each community, everyone 
involved (community leader, a spiritual leader, a trained caregiver, PLWHAs, health 
workers, youth leaders, women’s group leaders, and the Coordinator) will hypothetically 
form the Constituency AIDS Control Committee (CACC).  The Committee will hold regular 
meetings on current issues, problems, or accomplishments.  In this model, the overall 
emphasis is on the autonomy of the community but the relationship between it and a 
government health facility is stressed.  The main objective is to attain the maximum training 
and education with the minimum cost in order to help strengthen the health infrastructure in 
communities.178   
 In contrast, MSF’s HBC project is less organized, more autonomous, and more 
focused on biomedical care.  First of all, instead of relying on coordinators to train caregivers 
and health workers, MSF itself has a direct relationship with each volunteer and its workers 
are personally responsible for the volunteers’ training and support.  The volunteers are 
selected on the basis of advice taken from the sub-chief of the community.  There are often 
many community based organizations (CBOs) that will offer volunteers, but MSF chooses to 
work directly with the volunteer instead of through the CBO that recommended her, avoiding 
potential grassroots corruption and allowing more direct communication.179  Secondly, 
although MSF has a strong relationship with the MOH, it works independently from the 
government most of the time.  Rather than train volunteers and then send them out to jobs, 
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using precious money and time, the MSF coordinator does ‘on the job training’ with each 
HBC volunteers while visiting patients and giving medical assessments.  In this way, the 
patient is cared for and educated at the same time that the volunteer is being trained.  The ‘on 
the job training’ of volunteers is one example of how MSF employs their resources in order 
to achieve a much more simple program that does not require a lot of funds nor 
bureaucracy.180       
 After understanding how the management of the HBC is handled, it is important to 
understand the process that each patient must go through in order to obtain treatment.  First, a 
patient must come in for Voluntary Counseling and Testing services (VCT) provided by 
MSF, as well as most other health related NGOs, either on her own initiative or from the 
recommendation of a HBC volunteer.  In contrast to most of these NGOs, however, MSF 
offers VCT in conjunction with ART, greatly increasing the number of individuals that 
utilize VCT since the ART offers them treatment if they are indeed infected with the virus.  
In South Africa, for example, MSF’s VCT program saw a 1100 percent rise in the number of 
VCT patients when ART was introduced.181  Once an individual has gone through her first 
session of VCT, she receives a Prevention and Care Clinics card (PCC card) that will be 
checked by the HBC volunteer in her community as well as by the nurse at the clinic on each 
visit to ensure past attendance to counseling sessions and drug adherence.182  The card also 
acts as a check to the history of the patient on file as well as allowing the patient to go to 
different clinics for appointments.  The patient is also given a “client exercise book” which 
she keeps at home and the HBC volunteer records symptoms, social issues, and the record of 
visits.  The client is encouraged to bring the book to appointments so the nurse can reference 
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it to better understand the history of the client and the progression of the disease – two 
important pieces of information for deciding treatment.   
Once a patient has attended her first VCT and has received her PCC card and exercise 
book, she must make an appointment in two weeks to receive antibiotics and palliative 
care.183  After this appointment, another is made two weeks later and provides counseling on 
drug adherence and what anti-retrovirals are and how they work.  The nurse may then give 
one weeks worth of medicine to the client who will then come back the next week to obtain 
more.  This routine of checking in helps to establish a relationship with the client as well as 
provide assurance of commitment to drug adherence.  After the third appointment, the trips to 
the clinic become less regular, once every six weeks and then once ever three to six months, 
unless unexpected sickness occurs.  At each appointment, the client shows more commitment 
to treatment and she is reminded that it is a life-long regime that must be maintained.184   
The HBC project also depends on a referral system mechanism so that the patient can 
receive proper medical care when necessary.  The HBC volunteers are given referral forms 
with demarcated sections for name, date, location, symptoms, comments, etc.  This increases 
the continuum of care since symptoms or side affects pertinent to clinical diagnostics may be 
present at home, but absent at the clinic. Even though the medical diagnosis of the HBC 
volunteer is given little weight, her observations and advice often prove helpful to the nurse 
at the clinic.  Furthermore, every PCC has a list of the HBC volunteers that have been trained 
by MSF.  If a patient comes for VCT or treatment independently, he or she is given the name 
of the HBC volunteer in their community.  This removes some of the burden from the HBC 
volunteer in seeking out the sick and grants greater autonomy to the patient.  Also, it should 
be noted that there are other regular open channels of communication between a coordinator 
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and volunteers for a specific area.  It would be impossible for the HBC coordinator to spend 
time with each volunteer on a regular basis, learning about the patients.  Instead, the 
coordinator stops by previously specified checkpoints around town everyday where the 
volunteers can come and meet him with questions or concerns, such as a patient needing 
immediate care.  These open lines of communication are extremely important for everyone; 
the patient, volunteer, nurses; so that the patient can receive the best care possible.   
In addition to HBC projects, MSF also provides a complementary program called 
CAN – communication, advocacy, and networking.  With this program, the local MSF team 
organizes planned events focused on community outreach that are meant to educate specific 
target groups.  At least once a week, the MSF team supplies tea, lunch, pens and paper, in 
order to facilitate discussions, answer questions, and identify specific needs within the target 
group.  There is also support sessions available for clients to share stories and develop 
community, encouraging each other and sharing their experiences.185  The existence and 
operations of the CAN program illustrate MSF’s attempt to provide simultaneous prevention 
and treatment efforts.  Engaging the community, containing both sick and healthy 
individuals, in discussion and support sessions provides social treatment for the sick and 
prevention education for the healthy.  MSF’s HBC program in Busia, for example, coupled 
with CAN has increased awareness, reduced stigma, and offered life-sustaining treatment to 
hundreds of individuals.186     
Although the two HBC programs are striving to achieve many of the same goals, they 
are very distinct in their approaches.  While MSF has the comparative advantage of being an 
older program, the MOH/MMI incorporates all actors, increasing collaboration and human 
resources.  However, is does not seem that there is sufficient manpower or resource to 
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continue the high level of collaboration necessary to carry out the MOH/MMI program.187  
MSF’s program is also more vertical in nature and has a more direct relationship with the 
community.  The vertical strategy does not initially appear as sustainable as the MOH/MMI 
program, and sustainability is not something that MSF emphasizes.  The MSF project 
manager in Busia, Maria Vallles, stated, “MSF is a humanitarian relief organization.  
Sustainability is not in our vocabulary.”188  However, the “decentralized, minimal energy 
strategy” of MSF is more sustainable in the short run and may prove true in the long run as 
well.189  The major drawback of the MSF program is its limited capacity; they do not have 
the resources to reach all communities.  However, they are laying the foundation within the 
community and within the rural health facilities that will prove instrumental in the years to 
come because they are building the competence and the capacity of both the community and 
government systems.  Thus, identifying the gaps in both systems and working to resolve 
issues within the formal health sector and on the grassroots level appears to be a successful 
strategy.  Not only do the MSF programs directly affect all stakeholders, but also the stigma, 
the poor moral, and the plethora of demotivated individuals are being combated on all levels.  
On the other hand, the MOH/MMI program, in response to an over-burdened health sector, 
appears to be shifting the responsibility too far on the continuum of care.  The program 
appears to be placing the burden of care on the community with no concrete plans to 
intensify the development of the rural health facilities. There is a plan for “capacity building” 
of the rural infrastructure; however, without increased human resources, this will not become 
a reality.190  
The organizational methods and mechanisms that MSF has put into place have helped 
the program to be a success.  In each project area, MSF is able to provide life-sustaining 
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treatment to hundreds of individuals.  While the MOH/MMI program has placed the 
responsibility of accessing adequate medical care on the community, MSF has managed to 
bring it to the communities in need.  MSF Busia is simultaneously scaling up the rural health 
facilities, increasing the capacity of the referral system, thus decreasing the burden on the 
patient in her attempt to access care.191  The program also has a system of accountability 
built into it for drug supply, patient attendance, education and counseling.  The records kept 
on file at the clinic, the PCC card, and the communication between the HBC coordinator and 
volunteers are all mechanisms to ensure this accountability.  Accountability, along with 
giving legitimacy to the program, also helps with the success of drug adherence as well as 
MSF’s efforts to increase awareness and reduce stigma. 
 Along with the successes of MSF’s HBC model, there are also challenges that 
threaten the long-term sustainability of the program.  First of all, the program is limited in 
capacity.  It is successfully treating a couple hundred people in each area, but if it were to 
expand beyond that the communication would decrease, more resources – drugs, personnel, 
vehicles – would be necessary, and the HBC volunteers would feel more dislocated from 
MSF itself.  The program, therefore, can only continue to be successful on a larger scale if 
parallel improvement of infrastructure occurred.  The sustainability of volunteerism is a 
concern as well.  The care of a patient is long-term and volunteers, who may even be sick 
themselves, sometimes stop their work or visit their patient less and less due to financial or 
time constraints, the project manager for Homa Bay, Saleban, stated.192  Finally, the referral 
system, which the patient depends on to receive proper medical care when in need, contains 
dangerous weaknesses.  Many HBC volunteers, in attempting to help their patients, will 
make the mistake of diagnosing and treating illnesses that necessitate a health facility and 
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properly trained nurses.  This creates two problems: first, that the patient is not receiving the 
proper care, and second, she is given the misconception that the health facility is unimportant 
and inaccessible. If a failed referral system is combined with the inadequate health facilities, 
patients delay their visit to the clinic and eventually arrive with diseases that have progressed 
beyond the scope of the facility, which results either in permanent disability or death.193  
 
Conclusion  
 As the world and its inhabitants continue to ask the question of what should be done 
about the raging HIV/AIDS epidemic, especially within developing countries, MSF is 
providing an answer in Kenya in both word and deed.  MSF’s constant activism through its 
Access to Essential Medicines Campaign has provided crucial and much needed political and 
social leadership, helping to pressure the Kenyan government into much needed reforms.  
MSF’s strong and much heeded words are such because of their efforts in the field, at their 
clinical sites.  Working everyday with dying patients, trying to increase both the number of 
patients they can care for and the quality of care, MSF workers seem tirelessly dedicated to 
each individual Kenyan suffering from the deadly disease of HIV/AIDS.  Its efforts in the 
field are not only to be commended, but are highly respected for the unique insight it 
provides towards bearing witness.  This duality of activism, on a local and individual level as 
well as a large-scale national and international level, has led to the success and expansion of 
MSF’s Access Campaign and its clinical sites.   
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Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks and Recommendations 
 
 
Concluding Remarks  
MSF is the best international humanitarian medical organization.  In immediate, 
short-term humanitarian crises, it is always the first organization there offering primary care 
with pre-packaged medical kits.194  In long-term medical crises, such as the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, its clinics are widely available and predominately utilized by those who are sick. 
Its worldwide access campaign, the first of its kind within the organization, brings awareness, 
advocacy, action, and change.  Both areas illustrate MSF’s single-minded commitment to the 
individual in need through both medical care and bearing witness.   Throughout this essay, it 
has been demonstrated that the principles which embody humanitarianism are found within 
the structure and practices of MSF.  
The analysis of MSF has been a qualitative case study.  The documented voices have 
been those of the organization itself, former and current employees of MSF, journalists, and 
other institutions – all of which have dealt directly with those in need. Although further 
quantitative data would have served to support the conclusions made, it is ultimately the 
opinions of those being cared for and the leaders of international institutions that matter, both 
of whom have expressed MSF’s pragmatic ability to reach those in greatest need in short-
term crisis and long-term epidemics.  Therefore, the conclusions have bearing on MSF as an 
organization, on various other organizations that are similar to or work closely with MSF, 
and on the non-governmental community around the world.  Even though it has been a 
qualitative study, it is telling that MSF has the highest number of programs and is treating the 
greatest number of people with proper medical care within the HIV/AIDS pandemic of any 
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other organization around the world (providing ARV’s for over 25,000 patients in 27 
countries).195  
Chapter three discussed the history and organizational structure of MSF, after having 
presented a general organizational theory in chapter two.  Through the documentation of 
MSF’s institutional structure, financial policy, volunteerism, and focus on individual care 
MSF embodied the four principles put forth through organizational theory successfully.  
Through their non-hierarchical and decentralized structure, they have successfully 
empowered the grass roots sections of their institution to make change and serve those in 
need effectively.  They also have the ability to act quickly and correctly in times of crises.  
Their financial independence allows them great freedom in their budget, in their choice of 
projects, and in their desire to bear witness to injustice.  Volunteerism helps to maintain the 
vitality, flexibility, and eagerness that drive the determination, willpower, and creativity of 
the organization.  Without its first volunteer, Bernard Kouchner and the organizational 
structure that he helped to develop, MSF would not even exist.     
Chapter four discussed the principles of neutrality, impartiality, independence, and 
temoignage.  While each is complicated by politics, economics, ideology, and perception, 
MSF has demonstrated insight in their implementation from principle to practice in both 
short-term and long-term humanitarian crisis.  In extreme cases, such as the Rwandan 
genocide, MSF has shown its ability to discern how best to implement, if at all, its aid by 
utilizing these principles.  Its own leaders, such as Nicolas Torrente, have been highly 
influential in the international debates concerning the interpretation and implementation of 
these principles, specifically concerning the militarization and politicization of humanitarian 
 91
aid.  Over and over again, these leaders and the organization itself have stressed the necessity 
to use these principles as merely a means to the end of caring for those in greatest need.    
Chapter five discussed the practical implementation of MSF’s principles, most 
specifically bearing witness and proper individual medical care and treatment, in its long-
term HIV/AIDS programs throughout Kenya.  In terms of the access campaign, MSF has had 
measurable national and international influence.  The campaign was instrumental in the 
international initiative to significantly reduce the price of ARVs.  MSF works closely with 
the Ministry of Health in Kenya and consequently, has helped to pass legislation and start 
coalitions all aimed towards the end of helping Kenya’s AIDS population.  On a more 
grassroots level, MSF works within communities and home-based care models to help 
increase awareness, decrease stigma, and provide proper care and treatment.    This extensive 
knowledge of MSF is enough to critically analyze humanitarianism as it relates to the works 
of MSF and the organization: where it has been, where it is now, and where it is going. 
 
Recommendations 
Humanitarianism in general has faults that are of concern, both for the humanitarian 
and those individuals, agencies, or governments that work with them.  First of all, 
humanitarianism is more than simply executing a plan to heal a so-called “population in 
need.”  “It is a moral endeavor based on solidarity with other members of humanity.”196  
Therefore, the militarization or politicization of aid is of utmost concern.  Integration of 
humanitarian aid into the international community’s “coherent agenda” for solving an urgent 
humanitarian crisis allows it to become subservient to organizations that have only their own 
interests in mind.  And the “my way or the highway” attitude is nothing close to solidarity.  
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Secondly, the existence of humanitarianism does not absolve governments and international 
institutions from the responsibilities of peace and justice.  It also does not allow for 
humanitarian assistance to become the “paradigm for North-South relations in the post-Cold 
War period,” especially when Western governments are promoting the idea of a new 
humanitarian order yet decreasing their budget for aid to the poor.197  Also, it is not 
humanitarians that pull the triggers and drop the bombs that most often are a major source of 
crisis in the first place.198  Thirdly, it is crucial that humanitarianism only be considered a 
piece of the jigsaw puzzle for solving urgent humanitarian crises.  It could be considered the 
most critical piece because it represents civil society, i.e. those in need during a crisis.  In 
recognizing that they are only a piece of the puzzle, it is important for humanitarians to 
continue to promote the fundamental principles for they serve as a guideline for consistent 
humanitarian action. As Neil MacCormack argues: 
Whatever be the variations in possible moral positions which people may have, there are criteria of 
coherence and consistency of judgments and principles which can be and ought to be applied to 
anything which claims to be a ‘moral position,’ as distinct from mere gut reaction or knee-jerk 
prejudice.199
 
Finally, Humanitarian organizations must adopt MSF’s single-minded focus on caring for 
those in greatest need and encourage others to do their part.   
 Concerning MSF, there are two separate sections in which to make recommendations, 
short-term aid and long-term aid.  In general, MSF has been remarkably effective in 
providing medical care for those in greatest need in the humanitarian crises around the world.  
However, with the spread of the HIV/AIDS and its co-infections, MSF has shifted its focus 
from crises situations to long-term primary care. Unfortunately, it has failed to shift its 
principles and practices accordingly, creating a new gap between the needs of a community 
and the provision of care.    
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In regards to short-term aid, MSF is the best.  In fact, it was created to do just this – to 
be the most effective emergency medical relief agency.  Based off of its organization, its 
structure provides MSF with immense flexibility.  There is always an arena in which to 
debate among country offices concerning the best actions to take and there is also the 
freedom to try multiple options at the same time within different operational offices.  MSF’s 
financial freedom gives it the ability to go anywhere they want, whenever they want.  Their 
private donor base is so strong that they never find themselves in the situation where they 
must wait for donor money to come in before they can provide care in a time of crisis.  Quick 
and correct thinking, coupled with freedom of action are the most critical components for 
short-term medical aid, and MSF has mastered them.   
These two qualities can also be very useful within a long-term medical crisis, but they 
are not enough.  Where MSF commits themselves long-term, they also commit more time, 
energy, and resources.  Since it was created as a short-term aid agency, the principles that are 
important in that situation are also important in long-term crisis, but they are inadequate.  In 
order to be more effective in their long-term medical care, specifically considering 
HIV/AIDS, MSF must learn to root themselves in the community they are working in, 
developing a wider and deeper impact.  In this way, long-term aid is very different than 
short-term.  For short-term, an organization is there simply for emergency care only.  It is not 
for them to get further involved in any of the other aspects of the crisis.  In this scenario, it is 
vital that the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence are adhered by and used 
simply as a means to helping those in greatest need.  In doing so, MSF does not, and should 
not, become deeply invested in the political, economic, and social activities within that 
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community.  In contrast, long-term medical care requires the addition of different 
components and mindsets that do not need to be considered in short-term medical care. 
In MSF’s long-term aid programs, they need to become inextricably connected to the 
community in which they work.  Their adherence to their fundamental principles, in long-
term aid, will become more indefinite as a means to the end of caring for those in greatest 
need.  Social justice oriented practices, such as beginning to combat the problems of poverty 
and lack of education which help to perpetuate the disease, will become more applicable.  If 
MSF indeed desires to provide proper long-term medical care and treatment to those 
suffering of HIV/AIDS, they must learn to combat some of the root causes of the disease.  
This is not to say that their long-term care should become a development organization.  
MSF’s mission in long-term care remains the same as in short-term – provide proper medical 
treatment to those in greatest needs.  Their primary aim is not to promote development.  It is 
not the end that is different, but the means.   
There are two steps that are recommended here which MSF could take in its programs 
in Kenya in order to become inextricably linked to the community.  First of all, MSF needs to 
develop a community-based care model.  In the home-based care model, the programs are not 
run by nationals.  This promotes the undesired perception of the North treating the South 
because they are sick; a perception of charity instead of solidarity.  A community-based 
model, on the other hand, is specifically oriented to go to the people of the community and be 
run by them.  MSF currently has a policy which does not allow national staff to be directors 
of its programs.  The policy was put into place hoping to foster inter-cultural relationships 
and information sharing.  However, this is not how it works in reality.  In Busia, almost all of 
the international staff is Spanish, and they are all managers of the national staff.  The 
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Spaniards spend time with each other and the national staff talks about the international staff.  
An unhealthy domineering relationship is the result.  This policy must be the first to change 
if MSF is to become more effective in its long-term medical care through the integration of 
practices that promote social justice.  If national staff were allowed to become directors of 
programs, MSF would develop a more direct, involved, and equitable relationship with the 
members of a community in crisis.  For Homa Bay, this would most likely translate into MSF 
training nurses and doctors in the teaching hospital that already exists there.  For Kenya as a 
whole, MSF would integrate more services with the public sector that were more closely 
focused on grass roots development while continuing to work with the Ministry of Health.  
Ideally, the community would gradually come to see MSF’s presence in that community, not 
primarily as international, but national.      
 The second step that is recommended for MSF to take in Kenya is for it to 
“psychologically” recognize that they are there for the long-term and it will subsequently 
have a profound effect on what type of organization they run.  Their flexible and autonomous 
nature will become more useful once their mindset changes from emergency relief to long-
term care and treatment.  Their principles will be used in different way as a means to its end 
of caring for those in need.  For instance, even though those in need should not be sacrificed 
in order to attain peace, if a peace process has a direct positive effect for those in need in the 
long-term, MSF should get involved.  A parallel structure that is in need of a similar mindset 
change is the United Nations Security Council.  The Council was originally meant to operate 
under a Cold War mindset.  Its structure and actions therefore reflected this; however, the 
situation has changed.  The Cold War has ended and thus, both the mindset and the structure 
of the Security Council should reflect that change.  For MSF, it must recognize that it started 
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out as a short-term medical emergency relief organization, but has ended up as something 
else.  This realization will be reflected in changes to their philosophy concerning long-term 
care, changes to their structure, and consequently, changes to their practices.  
 Finally, understanding the lived experience of those whom MSF is committed to 
treating is just as an important means as understanding the epidemiological impact of 
prevention and care treatment projects.  Establishing long-term relationships with the people 
in the community will allow MSF to draw on the world’s wealthiest countries’ resources and 
on the lived experience of the world’s poorest communities.  The community based model, 
for instance, allows MSF to weigh the resources of wealthy nations and the lived experiences 
of the poor and sick on an even scale.  They are on the right path, but they need to go wider 
and deeper in their commitment to long-term medical care projects.   
From the outset, MSF was both a moral and a medical organization.  They provide 
effective assistance to those who are in greatest need.  Their commitment to the world’s sick 
and suffering reflects the commitment we have to our families, friends, and even ourselves, 
offering a lesson to all of those who consider themselves a member of the global community.    
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Appendix 1 
 
Médecins Sans Frontières – Nobel Lecture 
Nobel Lecture by James Orbinski, Médecins Sans Frontières, Oslo, December 10, 1999 
  
Your Majesties, Your Royal Highness, Members of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, 
Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen: 
The people of Chechyna – and the people of Grozny – today and for more than three months, 
are enduring indiscriminate bombing by the Russian army. For them humanitarian assistance 
is virtually unknown. It is the sick, the old and the infirm who cannot escape Grozny. While 
the dignity of people in crisis is so central to the honor you give today, what you 
acknowledge in us is our particular response to it. I appeal here today to his excellency the 
Ambassador of Russia and through him, to President Yeltsin, to stop the bombing of 
defenseless civilians in Chechnya. If conflicts and wars are an affair of the state, violations of 
humanitarian law, war crimes and crimes against humanity apply to all of us. 
Let me say immediately that the extraordinary distinction that the Nobel Committee has 
given Médecins Sans Frontières is one that we accept with sincere gratitude. But also a 
profound discomfort in knowing that the dignity of the excluded is assaulted daily. These are 
the forgotten populations in danger, like the street children who struggle each grinding hour 
to live off the waste of those who are «included» in the social and economic order. These too 
are the illegal refugees that we work with in Europe, denied political status, and afraid to 
seek health care, lest this contact leads to their expulsion. 
Our action is to help people in situations of crisis. And ours is not a contented action. 
Bringing medical aid to people in distress is an attempt to defend them against what is 
aggressive to them as human beings. Humanitarian action is more than simple generosity, 
simple charity. It aims to build spaces of normalcy in the midst of what is abnormal. More 
than offering material assistance, we aim to enable individuals to regain their rights and 
dignity as human beings. As an independent volunteer association, we are committed to 
bringing direct medical aid to people in need. But we act not in a vacuum, and we speak not 
into the wind, but with a clear intent to assist, to provoke change, or to reveal injustice. Our 
action and our voice is an act of indignation, a refusal to accept an active or passive assault 
on the other. 
The honor you give us today could so easily go to so many organizations, or worthy 
individuals, who struggle in their own society. But clearly, you have made a choice to 
recognize MSF. We began formally in 1971 as a group of French doctors and journalists who 
decided to make themselves available to assist. This meant sometimes a rejection of the 
practices of states that directly assault the dignity of people. Silence has long been confused 
with neutrality, and has been presented as a necessary condition for humanitarian action. 
From its beginning, MSF was created in opposition to this assumption. We are not sure that 
words can always save lives, but we know that silence can certainly kill. Over our 28 years 
we have been – and are today – firmly and irrevocably committed to this ethic of refusal. 
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This is the proud genesis of our identity, and today we struggle as an imperfect movement, 
but strong in thousands of volunteers and national staff, and with millions of donors who 
support both financially and morally, the project that is MSF. This honor is shared with all 
who in one way or another, have struggled and do struggle every day to make live the fragile 
reality that is MSF. 
Humanitarianism occurs where the political has failed or is in crisis. We act not to assume 
political responsibility, but firstly to relieve the inhuman suffering of failure. The act must be 
free of political influence, and the political must recognize its responsibility to ensure that the 
humanitarian can exist. Humanitarian action requires a framework in which to act. 
In conflict, this framework is international humanitarian law. It establishes rights for victims 
and humanitarian organisations and fixes the responsibility of states to ensure respect of 
these rights and to sanction their violation as war crimes. Today this framework is clearly 
dysfuntional. Access to victims of conflict is often refused. Humanitarian assistance is even 
used as a tool of war by belligerents. And more seriously, we are seeing the militarisation of 
humanitarian action by the international community. 
In this dysfunction, we will speak-out to push the political to assume its inescapable 
responsibility. Humanitarianism is not a tool to end war or to create peace. It is a citizen's 
response to political failure. It is an immediate, short term act that cannot erase the long term 
necessity of political responsibility. 
And ours is an ethic of refusal. It will not allow any moral political failure or injustice to be 
sanitized or cleansed of its meaning. The 1992 crimes against humanity in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The 1997 massacres in Zaire. The 1999 actual 
attacks on civilians in Chechyna. These cannot be masked by terms like «Complex 
Humanitarian Emergency», or «Internal Security Crisis». Or by any other such euphemism – 
as though they are some random, politically undetermined event. Language is determinant. It 
frames the problem and defines response, rights and therefore responsibilities. It defines 
whether a medical or humanitarian response is adequate. And it defines whether a political 
response is inadequate. No one calls a rape a complex gynecologic emergency. A rape is a 
rape, just as a genocide is a genocide. And both are a crime. For MSF, this is the 
humanitarian act: to seek to relieve suffering, to seek to restore autonomy, to witness to the 
truth of injustice, and to insist on political responsibility. 
The work that MSF chooses does not occur in a vacuum, but in a social order that both 
includes and excludes, that both affirms and denies, and that both protects and attacks. Our 
daily work is a struggle, and it is intensely medical, and it is intensely personal. MSF is not a 
formal institution, and with any luck at all, it never will be. It is a civil society organization, 
and today civil society has a new global role, a new informal legitimacy that is rooted in its 
action and in its support from public opinion. It is also rooted in the maturity of its intent, in 
for example the human rights, the environmental and the humanitarian movements, and of 
course, the movement for equitable trade. Conflict and violence are not the only subjects of 
concern. We, as members of civil society, will maintain our role and our power if we remain 
lucid in our intent and independence. 
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As civil society we exist relative to the state, to its institutions and its power. We also exist 
relative to other non-state actors such as the private sector. Ours is not to displace the 
responsibility of the state. Ours is not to allow a humanitarian alibi to mask the state 
responsibility to ensure justice and security. And ours is not to be co-managers of misery 
with the state. If civil society identifies a problem, it is not theirs to provide a solution, but it 
is theirs to expect that states will translate this into concrete and just solutions. Only the state 
has the legitimacy and power to do this. Today, a growing injustice confronts us. More than 
90% of all death and suffering from infectious diseases occurs in the developing world. Some 
of the reasons that people die from diseases like AIDS, TB, Sleeping Sickness and other 
tropical diseases is that life saving essential medicines are either too expensive, are not 
available because they are not seen as financially viable, or because there is virtually no new 
research and development for priority tropical diseases. This market failure is our next 
challenge. The challenge however, is not ours alone. It is also for governments, International 
Government Institutions, the Pharmaceutical Industry and other NGOs to confront this 
injustice. What we as a civil society movement demand is change, not charity. 
We affirm the independence of the humanitarian from the political, but this is not to polarize 
the «good» NGO against «bad» governments, or the «virtue» of civil society against the 
«vice» of political power. Such a polemic is false and dangerous. As with slavery and 
welfare rights, history has shown that humanitarian preoccupations born in civil society have 
gained influence until they reach the political agenda. But these convergences should not 
mask the distinctions that exist between the political and the humanitarian. Humanitarian 
action takes place in the short term, for limited groups and for limited objectives. This is at 
the same time both its strength and its limitation. The political can only be conceived in the 
long term, which itself is the movement of societies. Humanitarian action is by definition 
universal, or it is not. Humanitarian responsibility has no frontiers. Wherever in the world 
there is manifest distress, the humanitarian by vocation must respond. By contrast, the 
political knows borders, and where crisis occurs, political response will vary because 
historical relations, balance of power, and the interests of one or the other must be 
considered. The time and space of the humanitarian are not those of the political. These vary 
in opposing ways, and this is another way to locate the founding principles of humanitarian 
action: the refusal of all forms of problem solving through sacrifice of the weak and 
vulnerable. No victim can be intentionally discriminated against, OR neglected to the 
advantage of another. One life today cannot be measured by its value tomorrow: and the 
relief of suffering «here», cannot legitimize the abandoning of relief «over there». The 
limitation of means naturally must mean the making of choice, but the context and the 
constraints of action do not alter the fundamentals of this humanitarian vision. It is a vision 
that by definition must ignore political choices. 
Today there is a confusion and inherent ambiguity in the development of so-called 'military 
humanitarian operations'. We must reaffirm with vigor and clarity the principle of an 
independent civilian humanitarianism. And we must criticize those interventions called 
«military-humanitarian». Humanitarian action exists only to preserve life, not to eliminate it. 
Our weapons are our transparency, the clarity of our intentions, as much as our medicines 
and our surgical instruments. Our weapons cannot be fighter jets and tanks, even if 
sometimes we think their use may respond to a necessity. We are not the same, we cannot be 
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seen to be the same, and we cannot be made to be the same. Concretely, this is why we 
refused any funding from NATO member states for our work in Kosovo. And this is why we 
were critical then and are critical now of the humanitarian discourse of NATO. It is also why 
on the ground, we can work side by side with the presence of armed forces, but certainly not 
under their authority. 
The debate on the «Droit d'Ingerence» – the right of state intervention for so called 
humanitarian purposes – is further evidence of this ambiguity. It seeks to put at the level of 
the humanitarian, the political question of the abuse of power, and to seek a humanitarian 
legitimacy for a security action through military means. When one mixes the humanitarian 
with the need for public security, then one inevitably tars the humanitarian with the security 
brush. It must be recalled that the UN Charter obliges states to intervene sometimes by force 
to stop threats to international peace and security. There is no need, and indeed a danger, in 
using a humanitarian justification for this. In Helsinki this weekend governments will sit 
down to establish the makings of a European army, but to be available for humanitarian 
purposes. We appeal to governments to go no further down this path of dangerous ambiguity. 
But we also encourage states to seek ways to enforce public security so that international 
humanitarian and human rights law can be respected. 
Humanitarian action comes with limitations. It cannot be a substitute for political action. In 
Rwanda, early in the genocide, MSF spoke out to the world to demand that genocide be 
stopped by the use of force. And, so did the Red Cross. It was however, a cry that met with 
institutional paralysis; with acquiescence to self-interest, and with a denial of political 
responsibility to stop a crime that was «never again» to go unchallenged. The genocide was 
over before the UN Operation Turquoise was launched. 
I would like for a moment to acknowledge among our invited guests Chantal Ndagijimana. 
She lost 40 members of her family in Rwanda's genocide in 1994. Today she is a part of our 
team in Brussels. She survived the genocide, but like a million others, her mother and father, 
brothers and sisters did not. And nor did many hundreds of our national staff. I was Head of 
Mission in Kigali during that time. No words can describe the sheer courage with which they 
worked. No words can describe the horror that they died in. And no words can describe the 
deepest sorrow that I and all in MSF will carry always. 
I remember what one of my patients said to me in Kigali: «Ummera, Ummera-sha». It is a 
Rwandan saying that loosely translated, means «courage, courage, my friend – find and let 
live your courage». It was said to me in Kigali at our hospital, by a woman who was not just 
attacked with a machete, but her entire body rationally and systematically mutilated. Her ears 
had been cut off. And her face had been so carefully disfigured, that a pattern was obvious in 
the slashes. There were hundreds of women, children and men brought to the hospital that 
day, so many that we had to lay them out on the street. And in many cases, we operated on 
them then and there, as the gutters around the hospital literally ran red with blood. She was 
one among many – living an inhuman and simply indescribable suffering. We could do little 
more for her at that moment than stop the bleeding with a few necessary sutures. We were 
completely overwhelmed, and she knew that there were so many others. She knew and I 
knew. She released me from my own inescapable hell. She said to me in the clearest voice I 
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have ever heard «allez, allez ... ummera, ummera-sha» – «go, go... my friend; find and let 
live your courage». 
There are limits to humanitarianism. No doctor can stop a genocide. No humanitarian can 
stop ethnic cleansing, just as no humanitarian can make war. And no humanitarian can make 
peace. These are political responsibilities, not humanitarian imperatives. Let me say this very 
clearly: the humanitarian act is the most apolitical of all acts, but if it actions and its morality 
are taken seriously, it has the most profound of political implications. And the fight against 
impunity is one of these implications. 
This is exactly what has been affirmed with the creation of the international criminal courts 
for both the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. It is also what has been affirmed with the 
adoption of statutes for an International Criminal Court. These are significant steps. But 
today on the 51th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the court does 
not yet exist, and the principles have only been ratified by three states in the last year. At this 
rate it will take 20 years before the court comes into being. Must we wait this long? 
Whatever the political costs of creating justice for states, MSF can and will testify that the 
human costs of impunity are impossible to bear. 
Only states can impose respect for humanitarian law and that effort cannot be purely 
symbolic. Srebrenica was apparently a safe haven in which we were present. The UN was 
also present. It said it would protect. It had Blue Helmets on the ground. And the UN stood 
silent and present – as the people of Srebrenica were massacred. 
After the deadly attempts of UN intervention in Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, which led 
to the death of thousands. MSF objects to the principle of military intervention which do not 
stipulate clear frameworks of responsibility and transparency. MSF does not want military 
forces to show that they can put up refugee tents faster than NGOs. Armies should be at the 
service of governments and policies which seek to protect the rights of victims. 
If UN military operations are to protect civilian populations in the future, going beyond the 
«mea culpa» excuses of the Secretary General over Srebrenica and Rwanda, there must be a 
reform of peacekeeping operations in the UN. Member States of the Security Council must 
be held publicly accountable for the decisions that they do or do not vote for. Their right to 
veto should be regulated. Member States should be bound to ensure that adequate means are 
made available to implement the decisions they take. 
Yes, humanitarian action has limits. It also has responsibility. It is not only about rules of 
right conduct and technical performance. It is at first an ethic framed in a morality. The moral 
intention of the humanitarian act must be confronted with its actual result. And it is here 
where any form of moral neutrality about what is good must be rejected. The result can be 
the use of the humanitarian in 1985 to support forced migration in Ethiopia, or the use in 
1996 of the humanitarian to support a genocidal regime in the refugee camps of Goma. 
Abstention is sometimes necessary so that the humanitarian is not used against a population 
in crisis. More recently, in North Korea, we were the first independent humanitarian 
organization to gain access in 1995. However, we chose to leave in the fall of 1998. Why? 
Because we came to the conclusion that our assistance could NOT be given freely and 
independent of political influence from the state authorities. We found that the most 
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vulnerable were likely to remain so, as food aid is used to support a system that in the first 
instance creates vulnerability and starvation among millions. Our humanitarian action must 
be given independently, with a freedom to assess, to deliver and to monitor assistance so that 
the most vulnerable are assisted first. Aid must not mask the causes of suffering, and it 
cannot be simply an internal or foreign policy tool that creates rather than counters human 
suffering. If this is the case, we must confront the dilemma and consider abstention as the 
least of bad options. As MSF, we constantly call into question the limits and ambiguities of 
humanitarian action – particularly when it submits in silence to the interests of states and 
armed forces. 
Last week, the United States Congress passed a bill authorizing direct food transfers to the 
Rebels in South Sudan. This is a misappropriation of the meaning and intent of humanitarian 
assistance. It makes food a fuel of war. And it is a dereliction of a state's duty to use any and 
all political means to address a 17 year-long civil war that has left millions dead. Sudan's 
civil war today is a human misery where millions are displaced and at risk of starvation and 
disease; where people are bombed, robbed, looted constantly, and even enslaved, while 
corporate oil interests are protected, where humanitarian space is so severely restricted that it 
exists only in pockets; and where we and other NGOs and UN Agencies struggle to bring 
humanitarian assistance and protection. Is food the only political option to curb war? Food 
aid or humanitarian assistance, if it is to be «humanitarian assistance» – cannot be a tool in 
state-craft. In this case we must denounce the perfidious use of food that confuses the 
meaning of humanitarian assistance. If the political masks itself in an ambulance, then it is 
certain that the ambulance will be fired on. As well, if food is allowed to be used as a weapon 
of war, then it also legitimates that populations can be starved as a weapon of war. 
Independent humanitarianism is a daily struggle to assist and protect. In the vast majority of 
our projects it is played out away from the media spotlight, and away from the attention of 
the politically powerful. It is lived most deeply, most intimately in the daily grind of 
forgotten war and forgotten crisis. Numerous peoples of Africa literally agonise in a 
continent rich in natural resources and culture. Hundreds of thousands of our contemporaries 
are forced to leave their lands and their family to search for work, food, to educate their 
children and to stay alive. Men and women risk their lives to embark on clandestine journeys 
only to end up in a hellish immigration detention centre, or barely surviving on the periphery 
of our so called civilised world. 
Our volunteers and staff live and work among people whose dignity is violated every day. 
These volunteers choose freely to use their liberty to make the world a more bearable place. 
Despite grand debates on world order, the act of humanitarianism comes down to one thing: 
individual human beings reaching out to their counterparts who find themselves in the most 
difficult circumstances. One bandage at a time, one suture at a time, one vaccination at a 
time. And, uniquely for Médecins Sans Frontières, working in around 80 countries, over 20 
of which are in conflict, telling the world what they have seen. All this in the hope that the 
cycles of violence and destruction will not continue endlessly. 
As we accept this extraordinary honor, we want again to thank the Nobel Committee for its 
affirmation of the right to humanitarian assistance around the globe. For its affirmation of the 
road MSF has chosen to take: to remain outspoken, passionate and deeply committed to its 
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core principles of volunteerism, impartiality, and its belief that every person deserves both 
medical assistance and the recognition of his or her humanity. We would like to take this 
opportunity to state our deepest appreciation to the volunteers and national staff who have 
made these ambitious ideals a concrete reality, and who have, we believe, brought some 
peace to the world that has experienced such immense suffering and who are the living 
reality of MSF. 
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